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CALIFORNIA SIDEWALKS: A COMPREHENSIVE
SCHEME FOR DETERMINING MUNICIPAL AND
ABUTTER LIABILITIES
I. INTRODUCTION
Americans take sidewalk' travel for granted. People travel
along sidewalks while on their way to school, to work and in
the course of countless other pursuits. The widespread use of
sidewalks in this country raises the question of sidewalk safety.
Imagine the following scenario. Plaintiff Ann Pedestrian, ten
years of age, walks down the street to her piano lesson, as she
has been doing every week for the past year. As she reaches
the house of Piano Teacher, the abutting landowner,2 Plaintiff
Ann trips on an uneven slab of concrete sidewalk in front of
Piano Teacher's house. The slab has been elevated ten inches
above the rest of the sidewalk by the roots of a tree growing in
the parkway.' This sidewalk condition has existed for two
years. Both Piano Teacher and city workers have maintained
the tree. Plaintiff Ann suffers severe head injuries as a result of
her fall.
Q 1991 by Leonora M. Bova
1. "Sidewalk" is defined as including "a park or parking strip maintained in
the area between the property line and the street line and also . . . curbing, bulk-
heads, retaining walls or other works for the protection of any sidewalk or of any
such park or parking strip." CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE § 5600 (Deering 1978). See
infra note 3.
2. The terms "abutting landowner," "adjoining landowner" and "abutter"
refer to an owner of land actually touching or terminating on a sidewalk. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 11, 12, 39 (6th, ed. 1990). See United States v. Great Am.
Indem. Co. of N.Y., 214 F.2d 17, 19 (9th Cir. 1954) (court held that "the words
'ways immediately adjoining' embrace that portion of the sidewalk abutting or
touching the grocery store"). See infra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
3. "The term parkway refers to the landscaped strip adjacent to [or part of]
the sidewalk." Williams v. Foster, 216 Cal. App. 3d 510, 513 n.1, 265 Cal. Rptr.
15, 16 n.1 (1989). A "'parkway' [is] located between the sidewalk and the public
street running in front of [one's property]." Jones v. Deeter, 152 Cal. App. 3d
798, 801, 199 Cal. Rptr. 825, 826 (1984). Parkways are often landscaped with
grass, flowers or trees.
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The scenarios are limitless. There are many causes of un-
safe sidewalk conditions,4 which can lead to accidents occur-
ring on sidewalks adjoining a variety of locations, including
residential property,5 commercial property,6 property held
open to the public7 and "mixed use" property.8 The example
above, however, illustrates a more difficult case because the
residential abutter runs a business from her home.' This may
impose upon Piano Teacher a higher duty of care with respect
to her student-customers.'" Also, although the roots originate
from a parkway tree, Piano Teacher's maintenance of it may
increase her duty. Finally, city maintenance creates the possibil-
ity of city liability.
An injured pedestrian will usually sue the city," the abut-
4. See infra notes 109-49 and acccompanying text discussing various causes of
dangerous conditions.
5. "Residential property" is private property upon which a person lives or
resides, permanently or for a time. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1308-09 (6th ed.
1990). Thus, residential property includes all types of homes such as houses, con-
dominiums and apartments.
6. "Commercial property" refers to property relating to trade or to the
exchange of goods in general. Id. at 269-70. Restaurants, department and grocery
stores, movie theaters and amusement parks are commercial property involving
business activities.
7. Non-commercial property held open to the public includes parks and
museums.
8. "Mixed use" property inchdes property having characteristics of both
residential and commercial property. An example is a building in which the
property owner lives above his store. Piano Teacher's house is both residential
and commercial in nature. Not only does the teacher live there, but she also
conducts her business there.
"Mixed use" property also includes property that is neither commercial nor
residential. An example is a warehouse, not open to the public, that stores items
such as barrels of oil, inventory or furniture.
9. A clear instance of abutter liability would occur where an abutter leaves
his tools on the sidewalk and a pedestrian trips over them, injuring himself.
10. See infra notes 80-91 and accompanying text discussing how the status of
the plaintiff in relation to that of the defendant affects the duty owed by the
defendant to the plaintiff.
11. In sidewalk accident cases, the county may also be called as a defendant.
See, e.g., Peters v. City and County of San Francisco, 41 Cal. 2d 419, 260 P.2d 55
(1953) (plaintiff stied city and county). This is especially true if the county and
the cities within it have consolidated tinder one charter. See infra note 157 de-
scribing charter cities and charter counties, and the option of consolidating under
one charter.
Counties and cities are public entities as well as municipalities. Municipali-
ties are "prescribed localit[ies] invested with subordinate powers of legislation to
assist in the civil government of the state and to regulate and administer local
and internal affairs of the community." BLACK'S L-W DICTIONARY 918 (5th ed.
1991] CALIFORNIA SIDEWALK LIABILITY 465
ting property owner,'2 and anyone else that can be held re-
sponsible for an injury which can be attributed to the condi-
tion of the sidewalk.' In seeking relief from the city, the plain-
tiff must follow preliminary administrative procedures 4 and
must meet a rather stringent burden of proof.'" As a result,
lawsuits against public entities are frequently unsuccessful,16
leaving the abutting landowner as one of the remaining par-
1979). Municipalities include cities, boroughs, towns, townships, villages, counties
and districts (such as a unified school district). Id. Public entities, however, include
the state, the Regents of the University of California, counties, cities, districts, the
public authorities and other political subdivisions, including municipalities. CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 811.2 (Deering 1982 & Supp. 1991). As used in this comment, the
term "public entity" includes municipalities. See inf/r notes 22-58 for a discussion
of public entity (or municipal) liability.
12. In rural neighborhoods, most abutters are residential landowners or rent-
ers. In other areas, particularly in cities, property abutting sidewalks is often
commercial in nature, occupied by stores and businesses. See infra notes 59-152 and
accompanying text for a discussion of abutter liability.
13. An injured pedestrian can, for example, sue a litterer or the owner of
the goods over which he tripped. He can also sue a tenant in addition to the
owner of the abutting property. See, e.g., Peterson v. San Francisco Community
College Dist., 36 Cal. 3d. 799, 685 P.2d 1193, 205 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1984) (female
college student, assaulted by a male who jumped from behind untrimmed foliage
adjoining a campus stairway, sued the community college district for maintenance
of a dangerous condition which, together with a criminal attack by a third party,
injured her); Jackson v. K-Mart Corp., 442 A.2d 1087, 182 N.J. Super. 645 (1981)
(store patron injured in slip and fall accident on sidewalk connecting store to
parking lot sued property owner, commercial tenant and property manager);
Matter of Schreiber v. Revlon Prod. Corp., 5 A.D.2d 207, 171 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1958)
(claimant sited employer for injuries sustained during a business trip when, return-
ing to her hotel room, she slipped on an icy sidewalk).
14. See generally 35 CAL. JUR. 3D, Government Toiy Liability, pt. 2, §§ 83-129
(1988 & Supp. 1990) for a discussion of the California Tort Claims Act which
requires preliminary acceptance of the claim by the public entity as well as com-
pliance with other specific claims procedures.
15. See infra notes 33-57 and accompanying text discussing the elements
necessary to satisfy the plaintiff's burden of proof.
16. See, e.g., Nicholson v. City of Los Angeles, 5 Cal. 2d 361, 54 P.2d 725
(1936) (court reversed previous judgment for plaintiff, stating that city had fulfilled
its duty of reasonable inspection and supervision of city streets); Ness v. City of
San Diego, 144 Cal. App. 2d 668, 301 P.2d 410 (1956) (court affirmed judgment
for defendant city notwithstanding a verdict for plaintiff, holding that a
seven-eighths inch variation in height between adjoining sidewalk slabs is a trivial
defect of no danger to pedestrians using due care).
But see Acosta v. County of Los Angeles, 56 Cal. 2d 208, 363 P.2d 473, 14
Cal. Rptr. 433 (1961) (court found that a minor's violation of a city ordinance
prohibiting bicycle riding on sidewalks did not relieve county of its duty to main-
tain safe sidewalks for public in general, including plaintiff, whose use of sidewalk
was neither extraordinary nor unusual).
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This comment addresses and examines the current state of
California law with regard to municipal and abutter liability for
sidewalk accidents. Part II provides a state statutory back-
ground and examines the history of cases against public enti-
ties and abutters. 7 It also describes the means by which a city
can modify or completely invalidate general rules governing
city and abutter responsibility for sidewalk injuries. 8 Part III
identifies the problems created by the uncertain sidewalk
laws. 9 In part IV, the comment analyzes the convoluted state
of current sidewalk law and the misleading, sometimes con-
tradictory, statutory and judicial approaches. In addition, the
comment examines the threat that city legislation poses to the
uniform statewide application of standards governing munici-
pal and abutter liability for sidewalk accidents.2 0 Finally, in
part V, comprehensive legislation that modifies and clarifies
the current law is proposed. The result is an analytical scheme
that allocates fault in accordance with clear, rational stan-
dards.2 1
II. BACKGROUND
A. Municipal Liability: The California Tort Claims Act
The first defendant named in sidewalk accident cases is
the public entity22 responsible for the sidewalk, usually the
city.23 Suits against public entities or municipalities typically
result from the public nature24 of sidewalks and the likely
17. See inf/r notes 22-152 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 153-203 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 204-07 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 208-55 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 256-63 and accompanying text.
22. See supra note 11.
23. The plaintiff will initially name as defendants both the city and the
county to determine who controls street maintenance. This comment focuses on
cities, entities separate from the state. 45 CAL. JUR. 3D, Municipalities § 2 (1978).
Ilus, since counties are legal subdivisions of the state, they are not discussed.
CAL. CONST. art. Xl, § 1 (1970, amended 1988); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 23002
(Deering 1973).
24. "[H]ighways and streets are constructed for the use of the public. All
members of the public have an inalienable right to use make use of them . ..."
37 CAL. JUR. 3D, Highways and Streets § 55 (1977). "A sidewalk is a part of the
common highway." Bonnet v. City and County of San Francisco, 65 Cal. 231, 3 P.
815 (1884).
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misconception that governmental units own all sidewalks.2 5
1. Government Code Section 81526 and the General Rule: No
Government Liability
In California, government tort liability at the state and
local level is controlled by a section of the California Govern-
ment Code entitled "the California Tort Claims Act,"27 rather
than by the general rule of vicarious tort liability.28 Section
815 of the Government Code states that absent a statutory or
constitutional provision providing otherwise,2 9 a public entity
is not liable for injuries arising out of an act or omission of the
25. "An owner of land bounded by a road or street is presumed to own to
the center of the way, but the contrary may be shown." CAL. CIV. CODE § 831
(Deering 1990). Thus, in addition to his lot, an abutter is presumed to own the
fronting sidewalk and half of the fronting street, unless evidence to the contrary
is shown. The intent of the parties signing the deed to the lot is the determina-
tive factor. Speer v. Blasker, 195 Cal. App. 2d 155, 15 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1961). Al-
though the abutter holds a fee to the sidewalk and half the street, the fee is sub-
ject to a dedication (by the subdivider of streets) to the city. This dedication is
"legally equivalent to the granting of an easement." Jones v. Deeter, 152 Cal. App.
3d 798, 802, 199 Cal. Rptr. 825, 827 (1984) (citing Safwenberg v. Marquez, 50
Cal. App. 3d 301, 123 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1974)). Formal acceptance of tile dedication
results in the streets acceptance into the city street system. CAL. GOV'T CODE §
1806 (Deering 1978 & Supp. 1991).
The city may, however, hold actual title to the sidewalk. Like a private
landowner, a city may itself be an abutter. For example, since the San Rafael
Public Library is owned by the City of San Rafael, the City is an abutter and is
presumed to own the fronting sidewalk and half of the fronting street. Alternative-
ly, a city may take actual title to a street and its bordering sidewalks through
eminent domain. Section 4090 of the Government Code grants cities the power to
order the establishment of any public street and the power to acquire by eminent
domain any property necessary for the establishment of such a street. CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 4090 (Deering 1978 & Supp. 1991).
26. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815 (Deering 1982 & Supp. 1991).
27. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 810-996.6 (Deering 1982 & Supp. 1991). The Cali-
fornia Tort Claims -Act is sometimes referred to as "the Government(al) Tort
Claims Act." See, e.g., infra note 246. All code sections discussed in this comment
are California code sections.
28. Van Kempen v. Hayward Area Park, 23 Cal. App. 3d 822, 100 Cal. Rptr.
498 (1972).
29. "Statute is . . defined [in Government Code section 811.8] to include
only those enactments that are adopted by Congress, the Legislature of California,
or the people of California (by initiative act)." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 811.8 com-
ment (Deering 1982). California "statutes," therefore, include the federal and state
constitutions and enactments, but not local ordinances enacted by city legislatures.
Although government tort liability must be based on statute, the statute need not
be part of the California Tort Claims Act or of any other section of the Govern-
ment Code.
468 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31
public entity, its employees30  or third parties3s Further-
more, the liability of a public entity is subject to statutory im-
munities and to regular tort defenses available to private par-
ties. s
2
2. Government Code Section 835s3 and the Exception:
Liability for Dangerous Conditions of Public Property
A major statutory exception to the general rule above is
provided by Government Code section 835, which governs
liability for injury caused by dangerous conditions of public
property. Section 835 requires: (1) a dangerous condition of
public property; (2) proximate causation and a reasonably fore-
seeable risk of injury; and (3) an act or omission by a public
employee that created the dangerous condition, or the public
entity's actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condi-
tion. 4 This statute can best be understood by examining each
requirement.
30. Public employee liability is beyond the scope of this comment. See gener-
ally CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 810-996.6 (Deering 1982 & Supp. 1991).
31. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815(a) (Deering 1982).
32. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815(b) (Deering 1982). Examples include comparative
negligence and assumption of risk. See infra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
33. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 835 (Deering 1982).
34. Section 835 of the Government Code states:
Except as as provided by statute, a public entity is liable for
injury caused by a dangerous condition of [public] property if the plain-
tiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the
time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dan-
gerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably
forseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that ei-
ther:
(a) A negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public
entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous
condition; or
(b) The public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous
condition under Section 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to
have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 835 (Deering 1982) (emphasis added).
Another exception to the section 815 general rule is Government Code
section 814 which states that the California Tort Claims Act does not affect liabili-
ty based on contract nor does it affect the right to obtain non-monetary relief
against the public entity. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 841 (Deering 1982). Thus, a claim
by a county employee for compensation performed while tinder an employment
contract is not barred by the California Tort Claims Act, nor is an action for
specific performance. Longshore v. Ventura County, 25 Cal. 3d 14, 598 P.2d 866,
157 Cal. Rptr. 706 (1979); CAL. Gov'T CODE § 814 comment (Deering 1982).
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a. Dangerous Condition of Public Property
The plaintiff must first establish that the property upon
which the dangerous condition existed at the time of injury
was in fact "public property" or "property of a public enti-
ty." 5 Such property is defined to mean "real or personal prop-
erty owned or controlled by the public entity .... 6 In deter-
mining ownership, a court may look to the nature of the city's
ownership, that is, whether the city owns a fee or an easement
over the fee. In determining control, a court may look to the
public entity's power to prevent or fix the dangerous property
condition. 7 Finally, the court may examine whether respon-
sibility for the safe condition of the property would be im-
posed under the same circumstances, had the public entity
been a private defendant.3 "
Specifically excluded from the definition of "public prop-
erty" are "easements, encroachments and other property that
are located on the [public property] but are not owned or con-
trolled by [the public entity]." 9 This exclusion emphasizes
that the dominant estate owner,4° not the servient estate own-
er (the city),4 bears the duty to inspect the easement for dan-
gerous conditions.42 Additionally, public entities are not liable
for injuries resulting from the performance of maintenance on
35. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 835 (Deering 1982).
36. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 83 0(c) (Deering 1982) (emphasis added). The court
may also look to see whether title is coupled with control. Low v. City of Sacra-
mento, 7 Cal. App. 3d 826, 833-34, 87 Cal. Rptr. 173, 177 (1970).
37. Low v. City of Sacramento, 7 Cal. App. 3d 826, 833-34, 87 Cal. Rptr.
173, 177 (1970).
38. Id. See generally infra notes 59-152 and accompanying text.
39. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 830(c) (Deering 1982).
40. A dominant estate is "[Ifand that benefits from easement on another . ..
property." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 485-86 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added). The
dominant estate possessor is entitled to the "benefit of uses authorized by [the]
easement." Id.
41. The servient estate owner is "[t]he person whose land is subject to an
easement" benefitting the dominant estate owner. Id. at 1368-69 (emphasis added).
42. Generally, the owner of an easement bears the responsibility for its
maintenance. Rose v. Peters, 59 Cal. App. 2d 833, 835, 139 P.2d 983, 984 (1943).
Thus, if a city grants a business an easement across city-owned property to allow
access to the business and its customers, the business, as owner of the dominant
easement, is responsible for maintaining the easement. But see infra notes 59-73
and accompanying text which discuss a different rule in the case where the city,
holding a street easement, is the dominant easement owner.
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"any road which has not officially been accepted as a part of
the road system .. .if the [work] is performed with reasonable
"45
care ....
If the plaintiff establishes that the property is public prop-
erty, he must then show that the condition causing injury is a
"dangerous condition,"44 that is, one which creates a substan-
tial risk of injury when the property is used with due care in a
reasonably foreseeable manner.45
b. Proximate Causation and a Reasonably Foreseeable
Risk of Injuty
Section 835 also requires that the injury have been proxi-
mately caused 46 by the dangerous condition. Proximate cause
is causation unbroken by any intervening force. However,
nothing in section 835 precludes a finding that a public entity
may be under duty to protect against harmful criminal conduct
on its property.
47
Not only must the plaintiff show that the dangerous condi-
tion proximately caused the injury, but he must also show that
"the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk
of the kind of injury ... incurred . . . .,,4 A motorist, for ex-
43. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 831.3 (Deering 1982 & Supp. 1991). Conversely, if
the road has been dedicated to the city (if the city owns an easement) or if the
road has been taken by the city through eminent domain, the government can be
held liable for negligent maintenance if the road has been accepted as part of the
road system. See supra note 25. See also CAL. STS. & HIcmi. CODE § 1806 (Deering
1978).
44. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 835 (Deering 1982); Davis v. Cordova Recreation and
Park Dist., 24 Cal. App. 3d 789, 101 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1972).
45. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 830(a) (Deering 1982). A condition is not dangerous
if the court determines that the risk created by the condition is so minor or
insignificant, in view of all the circumstances, that no reasonable person would
conclude that a substantial risk of injury was created. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 830(a)
(Deering 1982 & Supp. 1991). For example, a sidewalk slab elevated seven-eighths
of an inch above an adjacent slab creates an arguably insignificant risk. See, e.g.,
Ness v. City of San Diego, 144 Cal. App. 2d 668, 301 P.2d 410 (1956).
46. "Proximate cause" is "[tihat which, in a natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which
the result would not have occurred" and "[tihat which is nearest in the order of responsi-
ble causation." BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1125 (6th ed. 1090).
47. Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Dist., 36 Cal. 3d 799, 811,
685 P.2d 1193, 1199, 205 Cal. Rptr. 842, 848 (1984). "Cases have recognized that
a public entity may be liable for permitting dangerous but not necessarily criminal
conduct to occur on its property." Id. at 811 n.10, 685 P.2d at 1199 n.10, 205
Cal. Rptr. at 848 n.10.
48. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 835 (Deering 1982). See generally 6 B. E. WITKIN,
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ample, might be able to recover for injuries resulting from
driving over a pothole in the street, whereas an airplane pilot
making an emergency landing on the same public street may
not be able to recover for injuries resulting from striking the
same pothole. 9
c. Negligent Act or Omission, or Actual or Constructive
Notice
If the above elements are satisfied, the plaintiff must show
that a negligent or wrongful act or omission by a public em-
ployee5" created the dangerous condition. If established, the
public entity may be held liable." Alternatively, if the plaintiff
can show that the public entity had actual or constructive no-
tice of the dangerous condition, he need not show that an
employee negligently acted or failed to act.52
Actual notice is satisfied when the plaintiff can establish
that the public entity "had actual knowledge of the existence of
the condition and knew or should have known of its danger-
ous character.""5 To prove that the public entity had construc-
tive notice, the plaintiff must present evidence indicating that
"the condition existed for such a period of time and was of
such an obvious nature that the public entity, in the exercise of
due care, should have discovered the condition and realized its
dangerous character."
54
SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW §§ 751-753 (9th ed. 1088) for a brief discussion of
forseeability of unreasonable risk.
49. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 835 comment (Deering 1982). It is forseeable that a
car would hit a pothole, but extremely unlikely that a plane would hit the same
pothole.
50. This assumes that the public employee is acting within the scope of his
employment. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 835 (Deering 1982). Public employees are
employees of a public entity. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 811.4 (Deering 1982).
51. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 835 (Deering 1982 & Supp. 1991). Liability is not
automatic. Public entities have many defenses and immunities available to them.
See infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text. Public employees may also be held
liable for dangerous conditions of public property. As previously noted, the liabili-
ty of public employees is beyond the scope of this comment. See generally CAL.
GOV'T CODE §§ 840-840.6 (Deering 1982 & Supp. 1991).
52. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 835(b) (Deering 1982).
53. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 835.2(a) (Deering 1982).
54. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 835.2(b) (Deering 1982). Evidence admissible to show
due care includes: (1) whether the existence of the condition would have been
discovered by a reasonably adequate inspection system; (2) whether the public
entity had such an inspection system; and (3) whether the public entity, operating
1991]
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3. Public Entity's Defenses and Immunities
Even if the party makes a prima facie showing by satisfy-
ing the requisites above, the public entity may avoid liability if
it can show that it acted reasonably under the circumstan-
ces."5 In addition to the defense of reasonableness, the public
entity may claim any immunities granted to it by statute 6 and
any defenses, such as comparative negligence and assumption
of risk, which are available to private parties.
5 7
4. Summary of Municipal Liability
Thus, although public entities are generally immune from
liability, to maintain a successful action against a city,'8 Gov-
the system with due care, failed to discover the condition. Id.
55. CAL. GOVT CODE § 835.4 (Deering 1982). With respect to an act or
omission of a public employee, the public entity is not liable if it shows that the
act or omission was reasonable. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 835.4(a) (Deering 1982).
Reasonableness is determined by balancing the likelihood and gravity of the harm
against the practicality and expense of taking actions to guard against such injury.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 835.4(b) (Deering 1982).
In addition, a public entity's showing of reasonableness will absolve it from
liability even though it had actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous
condition. Reasonablenes in this context is determined by considering the time
and opportunity the public entity had to take action, and by balancing the likeli-
hood and gravity of injury to those forsecably exposed to the condition against
the cost and practicality of protecting against such injury. CAL. GOV'T CODE §
835.4(b) (Deering 1982).
56. Many of these public entity immunities are also located in the Govern-
ment Code. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 815.2(b), 818.2, 818.4, 830.8, 831.2,
831.3, 955.1 (Deering 1982 & Supp. 1991). The Government Code sections in-
clude: immunity for injury caused by a public entity for an act or omission where
the public employee is immune (section 815.2(b)); immunity for injuries caused by
failure to adopt a statute (section 818.2); immunity for injury caused by failure to
issue, deny, or suspend a license (section 818.4); immuniiy for injury caused by ef-
fect of weather conditions on use of streets (section 830.8); immunity for injury
caused by a natural condition of any unimproved public property (section 831.2);
immunity for injury caused by maintenance of a road not officially accepted as
part of the road system (section 831.3); and immunity for failure to predict
earthquakes (section 955.1). See generally CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 810-996.6 (Deering
1982 & Supp. 1991).
Additional immunities are located in codes other than the Government
Code. For example, Streets and Highways Code section 1806 provides immunity
for failure to maintain any road unless it has been accepted into the county road
system. CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE § 1806 (Deering 1978 & Supp. 1991).
57. See infra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
58. The plaintiff may only proceed against the city if the city has accepted
the claim. See supra note 14.
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ernment Code section 835 mandates that a plaintiff successful-
ly show that a dangerous condition of public property proxi-
mately caused him injury and that the risk of such injury was
reasonably foreseeable. In addition, the plaintiff must show ei-
ther (a) that a negligent or wrongful act or omission of a pub-
lic employee created the dangerous condition, or (b) that the
public entity had actual or constructive notice of the danger-
ous condition. Finally, the plaintiff must, hope that the public
entity is unsuccessful in defending itself, failing to show that it
acted reasonably given the circumstances.
B. Abutter Landowner Liability
In addition to the city, a private party, normally the abut-
ting landowner, may also be named as a defendant in a side-
walk accident case.
1. General Rule: Streets and Highways Code Section 5616gP
In 1941, the California Legislature enacted Streets and
Highways Code sections 5600 through 5630.60 Section
561061 of the Code imposes upon abutters the duty to main-
tain and repair sidewalks.62 The code sections, however, limit
59. CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE § 5610 (Deering 1978).
60. These code sections were added to the Improvement Act of 1911 [the
Improvement Act], a division of the California Streets and Highways Code that
provides a system for doing street work. Sections 5600 through 5630 constitute
Part 3, Chapter 22 of the Improvement Act.
61. California Streets and Highways Code section 5610 states:
The owners of lots or portions of lots fronting on any portion of a
public street or place when that street or place is improved or if and
when the area between the property line of the adjacent -property and
the street line is maintained as a park or parking strip, shall maintain
any sidewalk in such condition that the sidewalk will not endanger
persons or property and maintain it in a condition which will not
interfere with the public convenience in the use of those works or
areas save and except as to those conditions created or maintained
in, upon, along, or in connection with such sidewalk by any person
other than the owner, under and by virtue of any permit or right
granted to him by law or by the city authorities in charge thereof,
and such persons shall be under a like duty in relation thereto.
CAL. STs. & HIGH. CODE § 5610 (Deering 1978).
62. Prior to the twentieth century, abutters had no affirmative duty to main-
tain or repair public sidewalks and could not be held liable for injuries resulting
from mere failure to maintain. Eustace v. Jahns, 38 Cal. 3 (1869). The California
Supreme Court stated that any duty to repair would have to be found in the stat-
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their purpose63 and intended application64 to, simply, pro-
viding an alternate method for performance and payment of
sidewalk maintenance and repair.
In 1944, the landmark case of Schaefer v. Lenahan65 inter-
preted language virtually identical to that found in section
5610.' In Schaefer, the plaintiff was injured when she stepped
into a hole in the sidewalk abutting the defendant's
property. 67 The sole issue was whether an abutter was liable
to travelers for injuries caused by defects in the sidewalk front-
ing the abutter's property.68 The court, upon reviewing inter-
utes. Id. at 14-15.
63. "This chapter constitutes a separate and alternate procedure for peiforming the
work specified herein .... " CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE § 5602 (Deering 1978)
(emphasis added).
64. Section 5601 states in relevant part: "This chapter shall only apply to
maintenance and repair proceedings, whether upon work originally done under this
division or otherwise, and shall not be used for the constuction of new improve-
ments." CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE § 5601 (Deering 1978) (emphasis added).
65. 63 Cal. App. 2d 324, 146 P.2d 929 (1944).
66. Schaefer interpreted section 31 of the Improvement Act of 1911 as amend-
ed in 1935. This was the first version of the Improvement Act to formally impose
upon abutters a duty to maintain fronting sidewalks. The language of the current
Streets and Highways Code section 5610 is essentially identical to that of the pre-
vious section 31 of the Improvement Act of 1911 as amended in 1935. The latter
provided in pertinent part:
It shall be the duty of the owners of lots . . . fronting on any por-
tion of a public street . . . when said street . . . shall have been
improved or if and when the area between the property line of said
adjacent property and the street line is maintained as a park or
parking strip, to maintain any sidewalk, curbing or park or parking
strip, bulkheads, retaining walls or other works for the protection of
the same in such condition that the same shall not endanger persons
or property and to maintain the same in a condition which will not
interfere with the public convenience in the use of said works or
areas; save and except as to those conditions created or maintained
in, upon, along, or in connection with such sidewalk by any individu-
al, firm or corporation other than said owner, tinder and by virtue of
any permit or right to them granted by law or by the municipal au-
- thorities in charge thereof, and such persons, firms or corporations
shall be under a like duty in relation thereto.
Williams v. Foster, 216 Cal. App. 3d 510, 516 n.8, 265 Cal. Rptr. 15, 20 n.8
(1989) (quoting the Improvement Act of 1911, ch. 771, § 2, 31 Stat. 2148,
2148-50 (1935)). Cf CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODk § 5610 (Deering 1978). See supra
note 61.
67. Schaefer v. Lenahan, 63 Cal. App. 2d 324, 325, 146 P.2d 929, 929 (1944).
In addition to naming as a defendant Lenahan, the current property owner,
Schaefer named the City and County of San Francisco, as well as E. J., Mary J.
and Thomas J. Burns, the former property owners. Id.
68. Id. at 326, 146 P.2d at 929. Schaefer did not allege that defendant
CALIFORNIA SIDEWALK LIABILITY
pretations of similar statutes69 by other state courts, 70 held
that the Improvement Act did not expressly impose liability on
abutters for injuries resulting from sidewalk defects, nor did it
provide that an abutter's duty to repair was owed to travelers
or to the city.7" The court concluded:
[Section 31 of the Improvement Act of 19111 was not
passed for the purpose of transferring the primary duty to
repair sidewalks to the property owners, and to relieve the
city of that primary duty and responsibility. The obvious
purpose of the statute was to provide a means of reimburs-
ing the city for the cost of the repais. To impose a wholly new
duty upon the property owner in favor of third persons
would require clear and unambiguous language .2
This holding gave rise to the "Sidewalk Accident Decisions
Doctrine,"73 which specifically limited an abutter's duty to
maintain and repair sidewalks as one owed to the city, not as a
duty of care (with resulting liability for injuries) owed to pedestri-
ans or the city.
2. Exception: Civil Code Section 1714(a)"4
a. Liability of Landowner for Harm Caused by Lack of
Care in the Management of His Property
Although Schaefer held that a landowner's duty to maintain
and repair the abutting sidewalk did not impose a duty of care
to the public, injured pedestrians could still sue under the tort
theory of negligence provided by California Civil Code sec-
Lenahan created the defect in the sidewalk. Id.
69. The similar statutes also called for work by the municipality and payment
by the abutter. Id. at 327-31, 146 P.2d at 930-32.
70. The court examined law from New York, Missouri and Kansas, among
others, and acknowledged examples of states which established a contrary rule. Id.
71. Id. at 326-32, 146 P.2d at 930-33.
72. Id. at 331-32, 146 P.2d at 932 (emphasis added).
73. See Jones v. Deeter, 152 Cal. App. 3d 798, 803, 199 Cal Rptr. 825, 827-28
(1984), for a brief discussion of the "Sidewalk Accident Decisions Doctrine." See
also Russell v. Sincoe Realty Co., 293 Mo. 428, 240 S.W. 147 (1922); Dixon v. Mis-
souri Pac. Ry. Co., 104 Kan. 548 (1919); City of Rochester v. Campbell, 123 N.Y.
405, 25 N.E. 937 (1890).
74. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714(a) (Deering 1978 & Supp. 1901).
75. In California, actionable negligence involves: "(a) a legal duty to use
1991] 475
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
tion 1714(a).76 Section 1714(a) states:
Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his
willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by
his want of ordinaty care or skill in the management of his
property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfuilly or
by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon him-
self.7
7
Therefore, if the sidewalk defect was somehow attributable
to the abutting property owner, that is, if the defect was creat-
ed by him or due to his negligence, the Sidewalk Accident
Decisions Doctrine did not apply,78 and the abutter could be
held liable. 9
b. Factors Affecting Abutter's Potential Liability Under
Civil Code Section 1714(a)
During the 1960s, cases interpreting section 1714(a) ex-
ordinary care, (b) a breach of such duty, and (c) the breach as the proximate or
legal cause of the resulting injury." 6 B. E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW
§ 732 (9th ed. 1988) (emphasis in original). "Under [this] duty approach, conduct
is negligent when it creates an unreasonable risk of harmn to some general class of
persons. If the plaintiff is not within that class toward whom the defendant is
negligent, the injury does not give rise to liability." Id. § 733 (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1964)).
76. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714(a) (Deering 1978 & Supp. 1991).
77. Id. (emphasis added).
78. Jones v. Deeter, 152 Cal. App. 3d 798, 803, 199 Cal. Rptr. 825, 828
(1984) (discussing liability despite the Schaefer rule).
79. Historically, attributability has been found in cases where a residential or
commercial property owner left some dangerous material on the sidewalk and a
traveler tripped on this material. See, e.g., Lee v. Ashizawa, 60 Cal. 2d 862, 389
P.2d 535, 37 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1964) (defendant allowed oil to run onto sidewalk);
Kopfinger v. Grand Cent. Pub. Mkt., 60 Cal. 2d 852, 389 P.2d 529, 37 Cal. Rptr.
65 (1964) (defendant market owner permitted gristle to remain on sidewalk).
Other examples include a property owner leaving tools on the sidewalk, or ne-
glecting to sweep the sidewalk of leaves from a tree on his property.
Attributability was also traditionally found where the owner had altered or con-
structed the sidewalk for his own benefit and the traveler slipped on that part of
the sidewalk so altered or constructed. See, e.g., Ross v. Kirby, 251 Cal. App. 2d
267, 59 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1967) (defendant maneuvered pipe on sidewalk for benefit
of his restaurant); Peters v. City and County of San Francisco, 41 Cal. 2d 419,
260 P.2d 55 (1953) (defendant built access ramp to enable him to bring cars tip);
Sexton v. Brooks, 39 Cal. 2d 153, 245 P.2d 496 (1952) (defendant paved strip
which allowed access onto sidewalk).
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panded potential abutter liability for sidewalk accidents.
Among the factors the courts considered were: (1) the status of
the plaintiff and the defendant, (2) the exact origin and loca-
tion of the hazardous condition and whether it was under the
defendant's control, and (3) the cause of the dangerous condi-
tion.
1) Status of Plaintiff and Defendant
One area affecting the possibility of landowner liability is
classification of the plaintiff based on the circumstances under
which he has entered the defendant's land. This classification
of the plaintiff as a trespasser," licensee 8' or invitee8 2 de-
pends upon whether the defendant's property is private or
80. A trespasser is a person who enters or remains upon land in the posses-
sion of another without privilege or consent to do so. 6 B. E. WITKIN,-SUMMARY
OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 904 (9th ed. 1988).
81. A licensee is a person who is privileged to enter or remain on land only
by virtue of the possessor's consent or permission. A licensee enters the land of
another for his own benefit rather than for the benefit of the owner-occupant. Id.
§ 909(a). For example, although a social guest has been invited, he is not an invi-
tee in the business visitor sense, but rather only a licensee. Id. § 909(b). Other
examples of licensees include those entering a store solely to get out of bad
weather, those taking, short cuts across another's property, spectators and sight-
seers, and salesmen soliciting at the doors of private homes.
82. Originally, California followed "the limited test of potential economic
benefit, adopted by the [Fiirst Restatement [which stated that an] invitee enters
[land] at the 'express or implied invitiation' of the occupant, for a purpose
of . . . mutual benefit to the owner or occupant and himself, or in connection
with the business of the occupant." 6 B. E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA
LAw § 918 (9th ed. 1988). This theory that invitees are "business visitors" has
been applied to "store customers, hotel guests, passengers in common carriers,
deliverymen, repairmen, and others of similar character." Id. § 921.
An invitee generally serves some purpose of the possessor. However, the
modern (Second Restatement) view held by California broadens the class to cover
"public invitees," that is, "persons invited to enter or remain on land as a mem-
ber of the public for a purpose for which the land is held open to the public."
Id. If land is held open to the public, the fact that the visitor does not pay for
admission, or the fact that the purpose of opening the land is not a business
purpose is immaterial. Thus, economic gain to the invitor is no longer required for
status as an invitee. Although no longer required, economic benefit of the invitor
is still a factor among many to be considered.
Common invitor/invitee relationships include: a customer entering a grocery
store to buy goods, a customer entering a restaurant, a salesman delivering goods
to a retail store, a plumber rendering plumbing services in a customer's home,
and a person entering a church. The invitors are the grocery store, the restaurant,
the retail store, the customer's home and the church, respectively. Id. § 922.
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whether it is held open to the public.8" Traditionally, a land-
owner owed different duties to trespassers, licensees and
invitees.8
4
In 1968, the California Supreme Court, in Rowland v.
Christian,5  repudiated the traditional trespasser-
licensee-invitee classifications which limited the duties owed
to licensees and trespassers and substituted the basic approach
of foreseeability of injury to others. The court stated that in
determining liability, the inquiry was "whether, in the man-
agement of his property, [a possessor of land had] acted
as a reasonable man in view of the probability of injury to
others .... ,8. Further, the court stated, "[A]lthough the
plaintiff's status as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee may in the
light of the facts giving rise to such status have some bearing on
the question of liability, the status is not determinative."" Thus,
the plaintiffs status became but one consideration in a list of
many used in determining liability. 8 This divergence from
83. See supra notes 5-8 discussing various types of property.
84. With respect to undiscovered trespassers, the landowner owed no duty; to
known or anticipated trespassers, he owed a duty of ordinary care as well as a
duty to warn of nonobvious dangerous conditions known to him. B. E. WITKIN,
SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw § 905 (9th ed. 1988). To licensees, a possessor of
land owed the same duty as that owed to known trespassers, except that he could
also be found liable if he knew of the dangerous condition undiscoverable by the
licensee, and failed to remedy it or to warn the licensee of it. Id. § 910. The du-
ties owed to an invitee included the lesser duty of due care owed to licensees 
as
well as an obligation to correct or warn against known dangers and to inspect the
premises to discover unknown defects. Id. § 923.
85. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
86. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 119, 443 P.2d 561, 568, 70 Cal.
Rptr. 97, 104 (1968). The test set forth by the court is in accordance with Califor-
nia Civil Code section 1714(a). See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
87. Id. at 119, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104 (emphasis added).
88. The list included: "the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree
of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection be-
tween the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached
to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of
the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a
duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost,
and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved." Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal.
2d at 112-13, 443 P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
Another factor courts consider in determining a landowner's duty to anoth-
er is the age of the plaintiff. California courts have held that in dealing with a
young child, a party must exercise greater care than he would in dealing with an
adult. See generally 6 B. E. WrrIJN, SUMMARY OF CAIJFORNIA LAW §§ 809, 810
(9th ed. 1988). This requirement also applies when a party knows, or should have
known, that children are customarily around or on the property in question.
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the traditional classifications was based upon the premise that
every person's life, irrespective of how he has entered
another's property, is equally worthy of protection. 89 Since
people do not usually mold their conduct in contemplation of
their status, the court stated that it would be contrary to public
policy to make their ability to obtain compensation dependant
on such a distinction 0
While Rowland greatly enlarged the duties owed to licens-
ees and trespassers, it had less of an effect upon the broad
scope of duties already owed to invitees."l Since Rowland, a
possessor's duty of care extends to trespassers, licensees and
invitees alike. The likelihood of the presence of others, howev-
er, continues to affect the foreseeability of injury to others and
consequently, the duty owed to them. Normally, this likelihood
is far greater for invitees than for trespassers.
2) "Premises" Includes Means of Ingress and Egress
and Other Areas Under Defendant's Control
Another factor affecting landowner liability is the meaning
of the term "premises." Cases have steadily expanded the term
to include more and more types of land.
a) Ingress and Egress, Street and Sidewalk
In 1967, the California Supreme Court, in Schwartz v.
Schwartz v. Helms Bakery Ltd., 67 Cal. 2d 232, 430 P.2d 68, 60 Cal. Rptr. 510
(1967). In Schwartz v. Helms Bakery Limited, the court held that a defendant
must consider normal characteristics of a child of a certain age, but also, the
particular characteristics of a certain child, if they are actually known by the
defendant. Schwartz v. Helms Bakery Ltd., 67 Cal. 2d at 243-44, 430 P.2d at
75-76, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 517-18. The amount of care due to minors is directly
proportional to their immaturity. See infra notes 92-95 for a discussion of Schwaliz.
89. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d at 118, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr.
at 104.
90. Id.
91. "[T]he legal duties declared to exist in favor of the invitee upon the
premises have been the highest judicially imposed upon the possessor of land."
Beauchamp v. Los Gatos Golf Course, 273 Cal. App. 2d 20, 77 Cal. Rptr. 914
(1969). Thus, it is clear that commercial abutters whose premises are held open to
the public will more readily be found liable than will a private landowner. The
reason is that while the former's guests are invitees, the latter's social guests are
only licensees. A more difficult instance is that presented in the introductory hy-
pothetical where a private homeowner conducts a business from her home.
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Helms Bakery Limited,92 expanded the term "premises" to in-
clude property beyond the boundaries of a possessor's title or
lease. The court stated, "[An invitor's] 'premises' may be less
or greater than [his] property" [and] may include such
means of ingress and egress as a customer may reasonably be
expected to use.
"94
In Schwartz, a four-year old boy was struck by a car as he
crossed the street to buy a doughnut from the driver of a retail
truck owned by the defendant. The court held the defendant
liable for the boy's injuries, finding that in undertaking to di-
rect the child to an assigned rendezvous with the bakery truck,
the defendants assumed a duty to exercise due care for his
safety. Thus, the case held that "[an invitor bears a duty to
warn an invitee of a dangerous condition existing on a public
street or sidewalk adjoining his business which, because of the
invitor's special benefit, convenience, or use of the public way,
creates a danger."95 Further, a defendant need not hold title
or a lease to the dangerous property to be found liable. In this
case, the defendant simply parked his truck along a public
street. Because Schwartz specifically addressed the
invitor/invitee relationship, the case is especially applicable to
businesses and other places held open to the public.
b) Areas Under Defendant's Control
In 1970, a California court of appeals held that a landown-
er may be liable not only for a dangerous condition existing in
a means of ingress or egress, or on a street or sidewalk over
which he had control, but also over any other areas over which
he exerted control, namely the sidewalk parkway.
In Low v. City of Sacramento,96 the plaintiff fell into a
water-filled depression in a parkway outside a county-owned
hospital.9 7 The trial court concluded that the sidewalk and
92. 67 Cal. 2d 232, 430 P.2d 68, 60 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1967).
93. See supra note 82.
94. Schwartz v. Helms Bakery Ltd., 67 Cal. 2d 232, 239, 430 P.2d 68, 73, 60
Cal. Rptr. 510, 515 (1967).
95. Id. at 239-40, 430 P.2d at 73, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 515.
96. 7 Cal. App. 3d 826, 87 Cal. Rptr. 173 (1970).
97. Low v. City of Sacramento, 7 Cal. App. 3d 826, 829, 87 Cal. Rptr. 173,
174 (1970). Because the Low defendants were the city and the county (public
entities), the case was decided under the Government Code. Analogy was made,
however, to cases involving private abutters as defendants. i. at 831-35, 87 Cal.
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parking strip 98 were owned by the city and controlled by the
county. As a result, a judgment was returned against both de-
fendants, and both appealed. 99
In affirming the lower court, the court of appeal held that
a possessor of land is responsible for the safe condition of the
land, possession being equated with "occupancy plus con-
trol.""° Thus, in determining liability, occupancy and control
dominate over title. In examining control,' ' the court stated
that inquiry may be made as to "whether the particular defen-
dant had control, in the sense of power to prevent or remedy
the dangerous condition; whether his ownership was a naked
title or whether it was coupled with control; and whether a
private defendant, having a similar relationship to the prop-
erty, would be responsible for its safe condition."' 2
In applying this rule to the facts of Low, Judge Friedman
found that Sacramento property owners, not the municipali-
ties, maintained the parkways abutting their parcels of
land."3 However, each municipality possessed an ownership
interest: the county owned the fee and the city owned an ease-
ment over it. More importantly, each possessed the power to
control: the city as easement holder and the county as abutter.
The county, in undertaking to maintain the grassy strip like a
private abutter, exerted control over the parkway. In so doing,
the county allowed ruts and holes to form, thereby permitting
deterioration and the formation of a dangerous condition.0 4
A public entity is, thus, "liable when [its] failure to main-
tain [the parkway] in a reasonably safe condition causes injury
Rptr. at 175-78. Furthermore, a subsequent abutter case, Jones v. Deeter, 152 Cal.
App. 3d 798, 199 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1984), relied heavily on Low. See in notes
131-40, 217-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of Jones.
98. A parking strip is the same as a parkway. See supra note 3.
99. Low v. City of Sacramento, 7 Cal. App. 3d at 829, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 174.
The city sought affirmance, the county reversal. Id.
100. Id. at 831, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 175.
101. For a finding of liability, California Government Code section 830(c) re-
quires that the public entity controlled the property. See supra notes 35-43 and
accompanying text.
102. Low v. City of Sacramento, 7 Cal. App. 3d at 833-34, 87 Cal. Rptr. at
177.
103. The court does not discuss how it arrived at this conclusion.
104. Deterioration was caused by seasonal rain and by drivers maneuvering
their cars over the rolled curb, permitting their wheels to rest on the grassy
parking strip. Low v. City of Sacramento, 7 Cal. App. 3d at 830, 87 Cal. Rptr. at
174.
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to a pedestrian."'10 Although section 830(c) of the Govern-
ment Code eliminates liability of a public entity when it sur-
renders control to the easement holder, 10 6 the county in this
instance, "retained control, in the sense that it retained power
to prevent or remedy the danger.""0 7 Thus, the prior judg-
ment against the county (as fee owner with power to remedy)
and the city (as easement owner) was upheld.'08
3) Cause of Dangerous Condition
The third factor to be considered in determining the du-
ties and liabilities of landowners is the cause of the dangerous
condition. As previously stated, Civil Code section 1714(a) has
traditionally been applied when a residential or commercial
landowner created a hazard by leaving a dangerous material on
the sidewalk' 9 or by altering the sidewalk for his own bene-
fit.1" 0
a) Not Created By Owner Nor Due to His
Negligence: Actual or Constructive Knowledge
Subsequent cases have expanded a landowner's potential
liability to include those hazardous conditions created by out-
side forces such as acts of third parties,"' acts of God,"
2
or everyday wear and tear.113 In these instances, a landowner
will be held liable if he had actual or constructive knowledge
of the dangerous condition.
In determining whether the defendant had actual or con-
structive knowledge, the court examines whether the condition
had existed long enough"t4 for the owner, in the exercise of
105. Low v. City of Sacramento, 7 Cal. App. at 833, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 176.
106. The county surrendered an easement to the city. Id. at 829-30, 87 Cal.
Rptr. at 174-75.
107. Id. at 834, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 177.
108. Id. at 834, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 177-78.
109. See supra note 79.
110. See supra note 79.
111. An example would be a pedestrian littering in front of an abutter's
home.
112. Acts of God include rainstorms, snowstorms, and earthquakes. See, e.g., In
re Schreiber v. Revlon Prods. Corp., 5 A.D.2d 207, 171 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1958),
where the claimant was injured when she slipped on an icy sidewalk. In this
instance the culprit was the weather.
113. See supra note 104.
114. Mere existence of the dangerous condition at the time of injury is not
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reasonable care, to have discovered and remedied it." 5
b) Created by Natural Conditions
The doctrine that a party controlling property is liable for
dangerous conditions on it was expanded in Sprecher v. Adam-
son Companies"6 to include situations in which "natural con-
ditions""" on one's property caused sidewalk injuries."'
enough to infer negligence on the part of the defendant. For liability to attach,
evidence must be present indicating that the condition had existed long enough
for the landowner to discover and fix it. Oldenburg v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 152
Cal. App. 2d 733, 744, 314 P.2d 33, 37-38 (1957).
115. Girvetz v. Boys' Mkt., 91 Cal. App. 2d 827, 206 P.2d 6 (1949); Louie v.
Hagstrom's Food Stores, 81 Cal. App. 2d 601, 184 P.2d 708 (1947); Owen v.
Beauchamp, 66 Cal. App. 2d 750, 152 P.2d 756 (1944). See, e.g., Oldenburg v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 152 Cal. App. 2d 733, 314 P.2d 33 (1957), where the
plaintiff stepped on a piece of chalk while walking on a sidewalk adjacent to a
Sears store and exclusively under Sears' control. The plaintiff did not contend that
the defendant was responsible for the chalk's existence on the sidewalk, but rather
that the dangerous condition had existed for such a length of time so as to
charge Sears with constructive knowledge. The court ruled in favor of Sears since
its employees inspected the sidewalks three or four times daily and had done so
the morning of the accident at 9:00 a.m. Since the plaintiff slipped at approxi-
mately 9:30 a.m., a mere half hour later, the defendant did not have the requisite
constructive knowledge for the imposition of liability. Id.
116. 30 Cal. 3d 358, 636 P.2d 1121, 178 Cal. Rptr. 783, (1981).
117. "Natural conditions" are similar to acts of God, but are not exactly the
same. As explained above, the latter relates to the weather or natural disasters.
The term "natural conditions," although used to indicate conditions of land which
have not been changed by acts of humans, "is . . . used to include the natural
growth of trees, weeds, and other vegetation upon land not artificially made receptive
to them." Sprecher v. Adamson Cos., 30 Cal. 3d 358, 362 n.3, 636 P.2d 1121,
1122 n.3, 178 Cal. Rptr. 783, 784, n.3 (1981) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 363 (1964) (emphasis added)).
In contrast "[a] structure erected upon land is a non-natural or artificial
condition, as are trees or plants planted or preserved, and changes in the surface
by excavation . . . irrespective of whether [the changes] are harmful in themselves
or become so only because of the subsequent operation of natural forces." Id. at
362, 636 P.2d at 1123, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 785.
118. "[A] possessor's liability for harm caused by artificial conditions was
determined in accord with ordinary principles of negligence . . . ." Id. at 362, 636
P.2d at 1122-23, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 784-85 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 364-370 (1964)). At common law, a possessor of land was absolutely immune
from liability for harm caused by conditions considered natural in origin. Id. at
362, 636 P.2d at 1123, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 785 (citing PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS §
363 (4th ed. 1971)). A landowner did not have a duty to correct conditions that
were natural in origin "[n]o matter how great the harm threatened to his neigh-
bor, or to one passing by, and no matter how small the effort needed to elimi-
nate it . . . ." Id. at 362, 636 P.2d at 1124, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 785 (citing RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 364-370 (1964)); PROSSER, LoW OF TORTS § 57 (4th
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The California Supreme Court noted in Sprecher that the
major factors used to determine reasonableness of a
landowner's actions" 9 had little, if any, relationship to the
natural origin of the dangerous condition.2' The court,
therefore, held that a landowner is not immunized from liabili-
ty caused by the natural condition of his land to persons out-
side his premises by virtue of the fact that he did not cause the
dangerous condition to arise.' 2 ' Since California holds an
individual responsible for any injuries caused by a failure to
exercise reasonable care in the management of his proper-
ty, 2 2 the question in cases involving dangerous natural con-
ditions is whether the individual has exercised reasonable care
with respect to the natural condition originating from or on
his property, or from or on the parkway fronting his proper-
ty.
12 3
(1) Origin of Defect: Defendant's Property
Moeller v. Fleming'24 applied the Sprecher rule to danger-
ous conditions originating from a defendant's property, from
his front yard for example. In Moeller, the plaintiff tripped on a
break in the sidewalk created by the roots of a tree growing on
defendant's adjacent property.' 25 Citing Sprecher, the court
ed. 1971).
119. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
120. Sprecher v. Adamson Cos., 30 Cal. 3d at 370-71, 636 P.2d at 1128, 178
Cal. Rptr. at 790.
121. See generally Sprecher v. Adamson Cos., 30 Cal. 3d 358, 636 P.2d 1121,
178 Cal. Rptr. 783 (1981).
122. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 118-19, 443 P.2d 561, 568, 70 Cal.
Rptr. 97, 104 (1968); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714(a) (Decring 1971 & Supp. 1991).
123. Hence, based on the examination of the common law rule, the Supreme
Court concluded that a departure from the fundamental concept that a person is
liable for the harm caused by his want of ordinary care in managing his property
is clearly unwarranted with respect to natural conditions of land. Sprecher, 30 Cal.
3d 358, 636 P.2d 1121, 178 Cal. Rptr. 783 (1971).
124. 136 Cal. App. 3d 241, 186 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1982).
125. Although the case dealt solely with the reversal of a prior summary judg-
ment favoring the defendant, it stated that a defendant is not immunized from
liability for an injury caused by a natural condition of his land to people outside
his land. Moeller v. Fleming, 136 Cal. App.241, 241, 186 Cal. Rptr. 24, 24 (1982).
The plaintiff claimed that the defendant was guilty of. maintaining a natural
condition that created a hazard. The trial court granted the defendant's motion
for summary judgment, but the court of appeal reversed, holding that the defen-
dant, as a possessor of land, was not immunized from liability to persons not on
his land for injury caused by a condition on his land. Id.
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stated that a jury could find a landowner liable for maintain-
ing 116 a natural condition on his property (a tree), known to
him to have created a dangerous condition outside his proper-
ty (an irregular break in the adjacent public sidewalk). 2 The
question in determining liability however, is whether the defen-
dant has acted reasonably in the management of his property
under the circumstances.
12
(2) Origin of Defect: Parkway in Sidewalk
"Natural condition" questions have continued to arise
since Moeller. In more recent cases, however, courts have exam-
ined liability for dangerous sidewalk conditions created by nat-
ural conditions originating in the sidewalk parkway as opposed
to the defendant's property. In one such case, the issue arose
as to whether abutters could be found liable for harm caused
by a natural condition outside his property. The courts, in
applying the exercise of control standard expressed in
Rowland129  and Low,' answered affirmatively. Although
courts have held that in theory, liability can attach, recent cases
have not held abutters liable for natural conditions on land
which was arguably within their control. Two such cases, Jones
v. Deeter and Williams v. Foster, illustrate the trend, but the two
appellate courts employ divergent rationales.
126. The court used the phrase "suffering the roots of his tree to cause ...a
dangerous condition." Id. at 245, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 26. Since the plaintiff listed
three theories of liability, the third of which was "maintenance of a natural condi-
tion known to have created a hazard on the sidewalk," and since the court re-
versed the summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the grounds that he
had not negated this third theory, it can be inferred that the court used the word
"suffer" to mean "maintain." Also, since the pleading charged that the plaintiff
knew the natural condition created a hazard, the court may have used the term
"suffer" to mean "allow" or "permit" the dangerous condition to arise. In any
case, the court infers some sort of responsibility on the part of the landowner,
simply by .irtue of the tree's existence on his land.
127. Id. at 245, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 25-26, citing Spircher, 30 Cal. 3d 358, 636
P.2d 1121, 178 Cal. Rptr. 783 (1981). Moeler applied the Sprecher standard.
128. Thus, the court does not examine whether the abutter planted the tree,
but whether he knew that the roots created a danger and whether he acted
reasonably given the circumstances.
129. See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 96-108 and accompanying text.
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(a) Jones v. Deeter'3
In Jones v. Deeter, the issue was whether an abutter could
be held liable to pedestrians injured when trees in the fronting
parkway created a dangerous condition on the sidewalk.'
The Court of Appeals for the Second District found for
Deeter. In its analysis,'3 3 the court noted that abutters are lia-
ble to pedestrians for defects in the sidewalk attributable to
their own negligence.' 4 The Jones court also distinguished
the Moeller case"3 - by recognizing that Moeller involved dis-
ruptive roots extending from a tree on the defendant's adja-
cent property rather than from a tree in the sidewalk parkway,
as was the case in Jones. Jones, the court said, turned on this
distinction.'
36
The court stated that abutters can be found liable in tort
where the injury is due to a sidewalk defect with its origin in
the parkway, but only if the dangerous condition is somehow
attributable to the abutter.'3 1 The court noted that in Low, it
131. 152 Cal. App. 3d 798, 199 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1984).
132. Plaintiff Jones sustained injuries when she tripped on a break in the side-
walk created by the roots of trees pressing up from under the concrete. The trees
grew in a parkway situated between the sidewalk and the street running in front
of the defendant's house. Deeter allegedly maintained this parkway by cutting the
grass and trees. Jones appealed the lower court's summary judgment for Deeter.
Jones v. Deeter, 152 Cal. App. 3d 798, 801, 199 Cal. Rptr. 825, 826 (1984).
133. The court first determined that Deeter owned the sidewalk and parkway,
relying on the unrebutted presumption that an abutter owns to the center of the
way. After examining the surveyor's report, the court determined that the sidewalk
and parkway were included in the area dedicated to the city as Second Street.
The relevant area was, therefore, owned by Deeter, but dedicated to the city. Id.
at 801-02, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 826-27. See supra note 25.
Then court turned its attention to Deeter's statutory duty to maintain. The
court noted that a dedication is the legal equivalent of the granting of an ease-
ment. In distinguishing a city's easement (with regard to sidewalks, parkways, and
streets) from easements in general, the court cited California Streets and Highways
Code section 5610, stating that in the case of sidewalks, parkways, and streets, the
duty of maintenance rests upon the abutter, not the easement owner, the city.
Thus, Deeter bore the duty to maintain the easement. Citing Schaefet; the court
stated that Deeter owed no duty of care toward pedestrians by virtue of his duty
to maintain. lId at 802-03, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 827.
134. Id. at 803, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 828. The court cited Kopfinger and Sexton as
examples of cases in which sidewalk defects were found to be attributable to the
abutter. See supra note 79.
135. See supra notes 124-28 and accompanying text.
136. Id. at 804, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 828.
137. Id.
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was shown that Sacramento property owners and not the mu-
nicipality, maintained the fronting parkways. In so doing, how-
ever, the defendant in Low allowed holes to form in the park-
way and as a result, the plaintiff fell into one of the holes and
sustained injuries. The Jones court stated that the Low holding
was based on the conclusion that the dangerous condition was
directly attributable to the abutting owner (the County of Sac-
ramento) because the county-owned hospital had exercised
control over the strip and had permitted it to deteriorate.'
Citing Low, the court stated that in some localities the
abutters bear a duty of maintenance, neglect of which can give
rise to liability. In localities where the city has habitually main-
tained the surface of the parkway, however, it is solely the
city's duty to maintain the area safe for pedestrians,'3 9 and
abutters failing to maintain cannot be held liable. 40
138. The Jones court stated, "[Tihe analysis in Low provides a basis for de-
termining when a dangerous parkway condition is attributable to an abutting
owner so as to impose a duty on that owner to alleviate the danger. This determi-
nation turns upon the historical patterns of care with regard to local parkways."
Id. at 805, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 829.
139. Id. at 804, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 828-29.
140. The Jones court specifically applied this rule to trees growing in the
parkway. The court stated:
We hold that a similar but separate rule applies with regard to the
trees planted on the parkway. In settings where the abutting owners
have . . . habitually trimmed or cared for them, these abutting own-
ers have the duty to maintain the trees in a safe condition toward pe-
destrians. The contrary situation exists when the city has planted the
trees on the parkway and has performed all necessary maintenance on
them. Under these latter circumstances, the duty to maintain the trees
in safe condition rests with the city; dangerous conditions caused by
the trees are attributable to the city, not to abutting owners.
Id. at 805, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 829 (emphasis added).
Finally, in applying its rule to the case facts, the court determined that
defendant Deeter only mowed, edged and watered the parkway, while city employ-
ees performed all the maintenance. Since the City of Long Beach habitually main-
tained the trees, only the City bore the duty to keep the trees reasonably safe for
pedestrians, and Deeter's simple maintenance did not imply a duty to make major
repairs such as removing roots from beneath the sidewalk. This was solely the
responsibility of the City. Id. at 805-06, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 829.
The court stated that the resulting duty placed on the City does not neces-
sarily carry with it a fiscal impact because "[sihould [the City] tire of its responsi-
bility to care for the [trees] at issue here, this task may be passed on to abutting
owners under the the procedure established by Streets and Highways Code, sec-
tion[s] 5600 [through 5630]." Unless this was (lone, however, the court found it
unfair to hold an abutter liable to pedestrians for injuries caused by defects in
the sidewalk and parkway, when "past practice [had] given that owner every rea-
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(b) Williams v. Foster4'
Five years after Jones, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
District decided Williams v. Foster.'42 In its analysis, Williams
examined many previous cases including Jones.4 ' The Wil-
liams court declared the Jones historical pattern of care ap-
proach unfounded in the instance where an abutter did not
undertake maintenance and no statute required him to do
so. 1" Williams also criticized Jones for falsely indicating that
son to believe that the City [had] undertaken responsibility to repair these de-
fects." Id.
141. 216 Cal. App. 3d 510, 265 Cal. Rptr. 15 (1989).
142. In Williams, the plaintiff filed a negligence action against Calvin Foster
and the City of San Jose for damages resulting from an accident that occurred on
the surface of a sidewalk that had been made uneven by the roots of a tree
planted on the parkway fronting Foster's property. Williams v. Foster, 216 Cal.
App. 3d 510, 512-13, 265 Cal. Rptr. 15, 16 (1989). By special verdict, the jury
found Williams thirty percent at fault, and Foster and the City each thirty-five
percent at fault. Williams obtained a judgment making the City and Foster, jointly
and severally liable for economic damages of $15,928.98, San Jose severally liable
for noneconomic damages of $16,590.00 and Foster severally liable for
noneconomic damages of $16,590.00. Neither the City nor Foster obtained a
judgment for indemnity. Id. Foster appealed the judgment, claiming that the duty
of abutters to maintain the sidewalk fronting their property established by Streets
and Highways Code section 5610 or by San Jose City ordinances, was owed solely
to the city and not to members of the public.
As the court stated, the languiage of San Jose Municipal Code sections
13.28.190 and 14.16.220 was substantially similar to that contained in section 31
of the Improvement Act of 1911 as amended in 1935, and the court's analysis
was equally applicable to both. Id. at 521-22, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 22. See supra notes
61 and 66. Thus, Foster argued that California Streets and IHighways Code section
5610 and by analogy, the San Jose ordinances, imposed a duty that was owed
solely to the city, not to third party pedestrians. He further contended that if the
ordinances did impose liability on abutters, they would be invalid as conflicting
with "the Governmental Tort Claims Act which concerns liability of governmental
entities, an area of statewide concern upon which charter cities may not legislate."
Id. at 514, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
Respondents Williams and the City of San Jose, however, argued that
Foster was liable to third party pedestrians for failure to maintain. Williams said
that because San Jose ordinances established a duty and because the City did not
undertake maintenance, the City had placed ultimate responsibility on the abutter.
Id. at 517, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
143. See generally Williams v. Foster, 216 Cal. App. 3d 510, 265 Cal. Rptr. 15
(1989).
144. Id. at 521, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 22. It further criticized the statement in Jones
that a city could alter a historical pattern of care approach by enacting an ordi-
nance. The Williams court stated that Jones failed to consider the language nec-
essary to do so. Id.
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Streets and Highways Code sections 5000 through 5630 provid-
ed a procedure by which a city could pass the duty and liability
to the abutters. "[I]n the absence of a statute or ordinance, a
person has no affirmative duty to keep premises he does not
own or possess in a safe condition."'45 But, a possessor or
owner does owe a duty to others by virtue of that possession
or ownership, to act reasonably to keep the premises safe. 4n
So, under Williams, where an abutter does not own or possess
the street easement, and does not undertake maintenance of
it, he is not liable for failure to maintain the sidewalk or park-
way in the absence of a statute or ordinance.
4 7
The Williams court, like the Schaefer court, was unwilling
to find that the duty to maintain as established by the Im-
provement Act was owed to the public in the absence of clear
and unambiguous language from the legislature, especially in
view of the traditional rule that abutters owed no such
duty.148 The court found the interpretation equally applica-
ble to the San Jose ordinances, since they were written in lan-
guage "substantially similar" to that of the Improvement Act.
The court noted that the city could have enacted ordinances
explicitly making abutters liable to third parties for injuries
due to a failure to maintain, but did not.'
145. Id.
146. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714(a) (Deering 1971 & Stipp. 1991).
147. Williams v. Foster, 216 Cal. App. 3d ht 521, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
148. Further, judge Capaccioli stated that the fact that Schaefer has been in
existence since 1944 without legislative counteraction buttressed the court's con-
clusion. "It is a rule of statutory construction that the Legislature is presumed to
have been aware of long-standing judicial construction of a statute and approve it
where that construction is not altered by subsequent legislation."-ld.
Upholding Schaefer and Williams, Selger v. Steven Brothers, Incoiporated held
that local Los Angeles ordinances (imposing a duty to clean sidewalks) did not
"expressly or unambiguously" create a standard of care owed to pedestrians.
Selger v. Steven Brothers, Inc., 222 Cal. App. 3d 1585, 1590-91, 272 Cal. Rptr.
544, 54748 (1990). See infra notes 196-203 for a discussion of.Selger.
149. The court dismissed the question of whether such ordinances would be
valid, that is, "whether the intrinsic responsibilities of easement or dominant
tenement owners and servient tenement owners is a matter of statewide concern
upon which charter cities may not legislate." Id. at 522 n.9, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 25
n.9. See infra notes 243-55 and accompanying text for an analysis of this question.
Since the abutter's duty to maintain was owed to the city and not to the public,
and since it was not shown that Foster planted the tree, acted negligently with
respect to his property, or did anything other than fail to maintain the sidewalk
and parkway, the court reversed, and found in favor of Foster.
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3. Defenses Available to Abutters
If negligence is found, both private and commercial
abutters may assert any of the typical defenses available in pri-
vate tort litigation to avoid or decrease liability. 5° These de-
fenses include comparative negligence15 1 and assumption of
risk.'
52
4. Summaiy of Abutter Liability
Although Streets and'Highways Code section 5610 has not
been interpreted to impose liability on abutters for failure to
maintain the sidewalks, Civil Code section 1714(a) provides an
alternative route for imposing liability. A large body of case
law interpreting section 1714(a) has accumulated. Ultimately,
these cases have increased the likelihood of abutter liability
since there is a broader range of circumstances under which
the abutter can be found liable. Thus, the exception provided
by Civil Code section 1714(a) effectively swallows the general
rule provided by Streets and Highways Code section 5610.
C. California Constitution Article X1, Section 5 15 and Its
Potential Effect on Municipal and Abutter Liability
In addition to the rules and exceptions regarding public
entity and abutter liability described above, article XI, section 5
of the California Constitution exists. If section 5 is implement-
ed by a California city, it can render these rules totally inappli-
cable within that city.
1. Charter Cities: Exclusive Power Over Municipal Affairs
In article XI, section 5, the California Legislature grants
directly to cities 54 and counties 55 the power to "make and
150. See generally 6 B. E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw §§ 1082-1113
(9th ed. 1988), for a discussion of tort defenses.
151. See generally id. §§ 1082-1103, for a discussion of comparative negligence.
152. See generally id. §§ 1104-1113, for a discussion of assuption of risk.
153. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5.
154. The two types of cities classified by tie state legislature, "general law
cities" and "charter cities," are to be distinguished. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§
34100-34102 (Deering 1974). With regard to creation, general law cities are orga-
nized under the general law, as enacted by the California Legislature. CAL. GOV'T
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enforce within [their] limits all local, police, sanitary and other
ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general
laws. " 156  In addition, section 5 provides that charter cit-
ies 157 may, in their charters, give themselves the power to en-
act and enforce ordinances addressing municipal affairs, 5 '
subject only to the limitations provided in their charters. With
respect to other matters, charter cities are subject to general
laws. 59 Under section 5, often known as the theory of "mu-
nicipal home rule,"' 60 charter cities have supreme authority
over general laws in "municipal affairs."' 6 ' Thus, with respect
CODE § 34102 (Deering 1974). General law cities are generally limited to "those
powers expressly conferred upon it by the Legislature, together with such powers
as are necessarily incident to those expressly granted or essential to the declared
purposes of the [city]." Irwin v. Manhattan Beach, 65 Cal. 2d 13, 20, 415 P.2d
769, 773, 51 Cal. Rptr. 881, 885 (1966). See inffm note 157 and accompanying text
for a discussion of charter cities.
155. Again, counties are not discussed in this comment. But see infra note 157,
discussing consolidation of a city and county under one charter.
156. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7.
157. The Constitution has, however, provided a mechanism by which a city (or
a county) can adopt a charter, thereby becoming a "charter city" (or a "charter
county"). Article XI, section 3(a) provides in relevant part: "For its own govern-
ment, a county or city may adopt a charter by majority vote of its electors voting
on the question. The charter is effective when filed with the Secretary of State."
CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 3(a) (1970, amended 1974). A city organized under a
charter is a "chartered city." CAL. COV'T CODE § 34101 (Deering 1974).
In addition, article XI, section 6 allows a county and any cities within it to
consolidate under one charter as a charter city and county. CAL. CONST. art. XI,
§ 6. Any reference to "a city" in part 11, section C of this comment is intended
to include a consolidated city and county, as described in article XI, section 6.
158. See infra notes 167-69, 174 and accompanying text.
159. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5(a). The full text of article XI, section 5(a) pro-
vides:
It shall be competent in any city charter to provide that the city gov-
erned thereunder may make and enforce all ordinances and regula-
tions in respect to municipal affais, subject only to restrictions and
limitations provided in their several charters and in respect to other
matters they shall be subject to' general laws. City charters adopted
pursuant to this Constitution shall supersede any existing charter, and
with respect to municipal affairs shall supersede all laws inconsistent
therewith.
Id. (emphasis added).
160. 45 CAL. JUR 3D, Municipalities § 95 (1978). Section 5 also specifically
grants charter cities the power to provide for (1) regulation of its police force;
(2) subgovernment; (3) conduct of city elections; and (4) methods for which and
the terms for which municipal officers are elected. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5(b).
161. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5(a). Section 5(a) allows a charter city to adopt
the home rule privilege by charter provision authorizing it to make and enforce
all ordinances with respect to municipal affairs, except as therein provided. A
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to these municipal affairs, city charters supersede all inconsis-
tent laws of the Legislature, subject only to limitations provid-
ed in the city charters themselves.16 With respect to all oth-
er matters, 163 charter cities are subject to general laws. 64
2. Municipal Affairs, Statewide Concerns and Preemption By
the State
Neither the California Constitution nor the cases inter-
preting section 5 have provided a test for determining whether
a subject is a "municipal affair" (over which the municipality
has full authority) or a matter of "statewide" or "general" con-
cern (as to which the legislative authority controls).' Judi-
cial interpretation is necessary in each case.16 6 Generally, mu-
nicipal affairs are matters of strictly local concern, 6 7 having
charter city generally has complete power over municipal affairs, except that it is
subject to clear limitations contained in the charter. A city's charter operates not
as a grant of power, but as an instrument of limitation on the exercise of powers
which the city is assumed to have under its own rule. It is unnecessary for tile
city to enumerate all its powers with respect to municipal affairs in order to
remove itself from the operation of general law as to such municipal matters. 45
CAL. JUR. 3D, Municipalities § 95 (1978).
162. See Butterworth v. Boyd, 12 Cal. 2d 140, 82 P.2d 434 (1938); Bishop v.
San Jose, 1 Cal. 3d 56, 460 P.2d 137, 81 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1969); Fresno v.
Pinedale County Water Dist., 184 Cal. App. 3d 840, 229 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1986). If
the matter is one of exclusive "statewide concern" or if the legislature has mani-
fested an intent to completely "occupy the field," the municipal legislation is
preempted by the general state laws. See infra notes 170-77 and accompanying
text.
163. These other matters include: (1) those municipal matters for which the
city did not (in its charter) grant itself the authority to legislate, and (2) all
non-municipal affairs.
164. In sum, charter cities may legislate on any affairs that are municipal in
nature (if their charters so provide), but must follow the general law as to all oth-
er affairs. General law cities, in contrast, must follow the general law in all their
affairs, including those deemed to be municipal. The Legislature has more power
over the affairs of general law cities than it has over charter cities.
165. See infra notes 170-77 and accompanying text which discuss statewide con-
cerns. 45 CAL. JUR. 3D, Municipalities § 99 (1978).
166. 45 CAL. JUR 3D, Municipalities § 99 (1978). Municipal affairs vary from
city to city. Id.
167. Sometimes an affair relating to property within a city may be of such
general concern that it may not be considered a municipal affair. For example, if
a city street has been declared by the Legislature to be a secondary highway, the
improvement of the street is not a municipal affair. Southern Cal. Roads Co. v.
McGuire, 2 Cal. 2d 115, 39 P.2d 412 (1934).
Cf Perez v. San Jose, 107 Cal. App. 2d 562, 237 P.2d 548 (1951), which
held that city tax funds (expendable only for municipal purposes) could be spent
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reference to the internal business affairs of a city.' 68 Typical
subjects of municipal regulation include the use of land, the
use of streets, and the regulation of occupations and
businesses within a city.
169
A problem arises, however, where a municipal ordinance
conflicts 70 with a matter of exclusive statewide concern or a
field which the Legislature intends to fully occupy.' 71 In
these cases, state law preempts the necessarily inconsistent
local regulations. In determining whether the Legislature in-
tended to occupy a particular field to the exclusion of all local
regulation, the courts must look to the whole purpose and
scope of the legislative scheme as well as to the language of
the particular enactment.
172
Preemption by state law occurs when the matter has been
completely covered or when the Legislature has clearly indicat-
ed that it will not accept additional legislation on the matter.
Preemption also occurs if the matter is such that the adverse
on the improvement of a street within the city, The Alameda, that was also part
of the state highway system. The court found that even though highways are state
projects, the improvement of a city street or state highway within its borders is a
city affair. Further, San Jose and its inhabitants received a special benefit as com-
pared with the rest of the state. Id.
168. 45 CAL. JUR. 30, Municipalities § 99 (1978).
169. 8 B. E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 793 (9th ed. 1988).
Other examples of matters held to be municipal in nature include local parking,
local public employees, local revenue and taxation, local utilities and municipal
elections. Id. § 803. In contrast, matters found to be of statewide concern include
assessment of county property, cable television, charter amendment procedures,
criminal records, franchise for telephone or power service lines, government subsi-
dized rental housing, intercity sewage systems, licencing of a member of trade,
milk industry regulation, school system, statutory liability, traffic and veterans. Id.
§ 804.
In general, municipal action which affects people outside the municipality
becomes, to that extent, a matter upon which the state can regulate. Committee
of Seven Thousand v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. 3d 491, 505, 754 P.2d 708, 716,
247 Cal. Rptr. 362, 370 (1988) (citing Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26
Cal. 3d 848, 879, 610 P.2d 407, 425, 164 Cal. Rptr. 510, 528 (1980)).
170. In this context, a conflict exists if a local ordinance expressly or impliedly
duplicates, contradicts or enters an area fully occupied by general law. California
Water & Tel. Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 253 Cal. App. 2d 16, 61 Cal. Rptr.
618 (1967).
171. If the state's preemption is not complete, local supplements are not
deemed conflicting to the extent that they cover phases that have not been cov-
ered by state law. 45 CAL. JUR. 3D, Municipalities § 93 (1978).
172. Id. Sometimes state laws declare that their provisions are not exclusive
and that cities may also regulate the subject. 8 B. E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALI-
FORNIA LAw § 798 (9th ed. 1988).
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effect on transient citizens outweighs the benefit to the
city. 173 Any reasonable doubt as to whether a matter is a mu-
nicipal17 14 or statewide concern will be resolved by the courts
in favor of the state.'7" An example of an area held preempt-
ed by state law is government tort liability. 171 Specifically, lia-
bility of a city or other municipality to one injured as a result
of a defective condition of its property is solely a matter of gener-
al state concern and not within the sphere of municipal affairs.
177
173. More specifically, preemption by state law as to municipal affairs occurs
when:
(1) the subject matter has been so fully and completely covered by
general law as to clearly indicate that it has become exclusively a
matter of state concern;
(2) the subject matter has been partially covered by general law
couched in such terms as to indicate clearly that a paramount state
concern will not tolerate further or additional local action; or
(3) the subject matter has been partially covered by general law, and
the subject is of such a nature that the adverse effect of a local char-
ter provision or ordinance on the transient citizens of the state out-
weighs the possible benefit to the city.
45 CAL. JUR. 3D, Municipalities § 93 (1978).
174. Examples of areas in which local regualtions have been held to be valid
include: municipal elections; public improvements having special concern to city
inhabitants; street opening, maintenance and improvement; building permit issu-
ance; animal impounding; municipal property leasing; taxation for revenue for
municipal purposes; rent control; water supplying and waste removal; parks and
recreational facilities; and local transportation. 8 B. E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF
CALIFORNIA LAW §§ 795-796 (9th ed. 1988). See also supra note 167.
175. Id. § 99. The Legislature does not have the power to determine what
constitutes a municipal affair. In addition, the Legislature cannot change a munici-
pal affair into a matter of statewide concern. Sometimes, a subject is both a
municipal affair as well as a matter of statewide concern. City of Redwood City v.
Moore, 231 Cal. App. 2d 563, 42 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1965).
176. In California, government tort liability at the state and local level is
governed exclusively by the California Tort Claims Act. See generally CAL. GOV'T
CODE §§ 810-996.6 (Deering 1982 & Supp. 1991).
177. 45 CAL. JUR. 3D, Municipalities § 112 (1978).
The state may, for example, enact a statute imposing on citizens pub-
lic liability for injuries resulting from defective public . . . build-
ings . ..and a city cannot by adoption of a chatter exclude itself from the
operation of this general law. Also, a charter or ordinance prescribing a
period different than that prescribed by state statute for presentation
of a claim for injuries sustained from a dangerous condition of [the
building] does not control.
Id. (emphasis added).
Additional examples of areas which have been preempted by the state in-
clude: public improvements transcending city boundaries, railroad crossings, city
traffic regulation, building contractor licensing, telephone line construction, crimi-
nal activities, land development, trade and professions licensing, and telephone
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Having examined how article XI, section 5 of the Califor-
nia Constitution enables charter cities to make and enforce
laws regarding municipal affairs, it is also important to under-
stand how attorneys and courts have employed these charter
city ordinances and how they operate in conjunction with state
statutes.
3. Current Judicial Utilization of Local Ordinances
If a sidewalk accident case involves a general law city
178
as a defendant, the court looks to the general state laws, that
is, to California Streets and Highways Code section 5610, Civil
Code section 1714(a), Government Code section 835, and to
the relevant case law for rules regarding sidewalk maintenance
and liability for accidents. If one of the defendants is a charter
city,179 the court looks to local legislation (such as municipal
regulations and other ordinances authorized by the city char-
ter) for any rules regarding sidewalks.' Thus, if local ordi-
nances exist and if they are specifically pleaded, the court con-
siders the standards provided by the city code. In addition to
the local legislation, the court refers to the general state laws.
Parties and courts utilize state laws even when local sidewalk
ordinances exist.1
81
Finally, a court must consult state rules, that is the Califor-
nia Tort Claims Act,18 in addition to city ordinances when
the city, in addition to the abutter, is called as a defendant. In
this instance, the court is examining municipal liability, an area
of statewide concern upon which no city (general law or char-
ter) may legislate.8 3
The above approach is demonstrated in City of Sacramento
communications. Id. § 797.
178. See supra note 154.
179. The defendant may also be a county, or a consolidated city and county.
See, e.g., Peters v. City and County of San Francisco, 41 Cal. 2d 419, 260 P.2d 55
(1953), where plaintiffs sued both the city and county.
180. The local regulations must be specifically pleaded.
181. Consulting state laws is especially helpful or necessary when the city code
and the state statutes are similar; when the city code is ambiguous; when the facts
in a particular case indicate a necessity for law beyond the scope prosided by the
local city legislation; when the party has not pleaded the local ordinance; or when
the city code is void because it has been preempted.
182. See supra notes 22-58 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 173-77 and accompanying text.
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v. Gemsch Investment Co., Jones v. Deeter, Williams v. Foster, and
Selger v. Steven Brothers, Inc.'84
a. City of Sacramento v. Gemsch Investment Co.185
In City of Sacramento v. Gemsch Investment Company,186 a
pedestrian slipped on seeds on a sidewalk that had not been
cleaned in five years.8 7 The Court of Appeals for the Third
District found that the local Sacramento ordinances requiring
abutters to repair sidewalks, requiring abutters to notify the
city of sidewalk defects, and allowing actions against abutters
for failure to repair the sidewalks,'88 did not create a con-
184. See also Moeller v. Fleming, 136 Cal. App. 3d 241, 186 Cal. Rptr. 24
(1982). In Moeller, the court assumed (without ruling) that under the Schaefer
analysis the San Jose ordinances did not make the abutter liable to a plaintiff for
injury due to abutter's failure to maintain. Id.
185. 115 Cal. App. 3d 869, 171 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1981).
186. The lower court granted summary judgment for the settling defendants
on the City's cross-complaint for indemnity. Although the case was primarily a
contribution and indemnity case, it exemplifies the use of local ordinances by the
court.
187. City of Sacramento v. Gemsch Investment Co., 115 Cal. App. 3d 869,
871, 171 Cal. Rptr. 764, 765 (1981).
188. The Gemsch court, quoting the Sacramento ordinances in effect on the
accident date, stated:
The City [of Sacramento] had certain ordinances in effect on the
accident date . . . . which we quote as follows:
"Sec. 38.71: Owners to repair defective sidewalks. Any person own-
ing real property in the city shall repair any defective sidewalk lying
in front of or along the side of his property. (Ord. No. 428, § 1.)
"Sec. 38.72: Tenants to notify city engineer of defective sidewalk.
Any tenant of real property in the city shall report to the city engi-
neer in writing the fact that any defective sidewalk exists in front of
or along the side of the property occupied by him. (Ord. No. 428, §
2.)
.Sec. 38.74: Liabilities for injuries where repair or report not made.
If, in consequence of any sidewalk being defective and in condition
to endanger persons passing thereon, any person, while exercising
ordinary care to avoid the danger, who . . . suffers damage to his
person . . . through any defect of a sidewalk may have recourse for
damages thus suffered against the person failing to repair such defect or the
person failing to report the defect. (Ord. No. 428, § 5.)
"Sec. 38.75: Purpose of article. It is not the intent of any of the
provisions of this article to change the procedure concerning sidewalk
repairs set forth in the Improvement Act of 1911, but to provide
alternative and supplementary procedure. (Ord. No. 428, § 6.)"
City of Sacramento v. Gemsch Investment Co., 115 Cal. App. 3d at 872, 171 Cal.
Rptr. at 765-66 (emphasis added) (the case cited sections of the Sacramento ordi-
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tract of indemnity between the City and Sacramento abutters. In-
demnity was therefore barred. 9
b. Jones and Williams Compared
The Jones court did not look to a code or ordinance of the
City of Long Beach. 9 ° Instead, it relied heavily on Low in
reaching its decision. Although the defendants in Low were
public entities and were therefore -subject to Government
Code section 835, the Low court likened the county to an abut-
ter. Since section 5610 does not impose liability upon abutters
for failure to maintain, and since a city code imposing such
liability did not exist, the court examined the historical mainte-
nance of Long Beach sidewalks. The court stated that the City
of Long Beach, as the traditional maintainer of sidewalks, was
liable for injuries caused by a dangerous sidewalk condition
created by parkway trees. Conversely, had the City's abutters
historically maintained the parkway, then the abutter could
have be held liable for injuries caused by his failure to so main-
tain.' 9 '
In applying this historical approach to the facts, the court
found that the abutter was not liable because the City had his-
torically cared for the parkway, and it would be unfair to im-
pose liability when past practice indicated that the City would
maintain the parkway. 9
The Williams court examined both section 5610 of the
Streets and Highways Code as well as the nearly identical San
Jose Municipal Code sections.193 Noting the previous Schaefer
determination that the duty to maintain imposed by section
5610 was not a duty of care, and noting that the relevant por-
tions of the San Jose Code were written in language "substan-
nances that were in effect at the time of the accident).
189. See also Moeller v. Fleming, 136 Cal. App. 3d 241, 186 Cal. App. Rptr.
24 (1982). In Moeller, the court assumed, without ruling, that under the Schaefer
analysis, the San Jose ordinances did not make the abutter liable to an injured
plaintiff for injury due to abutter's failure to maintain. Id. at 244, 186 Cal. Rptr.
at 25.
190. It is possible that the parties failed to plead any Long Beach ordinances.
It is also possible that Long Beach was not under charter or that its charter did
not address sidewalk maintenance or liability.
191. Jones v. Deeter, 152 Cal. App. 3d 798, 199 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1984).
192. d.
193. Williams v. Foster, 216 Cal. App. 3d 510, 265 Cal. Rptr. 15 (1989).
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tially similar" to section 5610, the court found that the state
statute and the local ordinances imposing upon abutters a duty
to maintain was not owed to the public, but solely to the
city. 19
4
The court, rejecting the Jones historical pattern of care
approach, stated:
[I]n the absence of a statute or ordinance, a person has no
affirmative duty to keep premises he does not own or
possess in a safe condition. Thus, where a particular abut-
ter does not possess or own the street easement, and does
not undertake maintenance of it, [he is not liable] for fail-
ure to properly maintain the sidewalk or planting strip in
the absence of statute or ordinance. 9
5
UnlikeJones, the Williams court was unwilling to find liabil-
ity absent clear and unambiguous language from the state or
local legislature. Since neither the Improvement Act nor the
San Jose Code provided such language, the abutter was not
held liable.
c. Selger v. Steven Brothers, Inc.'96
The Williams approach was used in Selger v. Steven Brothers,
Incorporated. In Selger, a pedestrian slipped and fell on dog
droppings on a sidewalk abutting defendant's Los Angeles
nursery and hardware business.9 7 At trial, the judge instruct-
ed the jury that violation of the local Los Angeles ordinances
requiring abutters to clean sidewalks' 98  constituted negli-
194. Id.
195. Id. at 521, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 23-24 (emphasis added).
196. 222 Cal. App. 3d 1585, 272 Cal. Rptr. 544 (1990).
197. Selger v. Steven Brothers, Inc., 222 Cal. App. 3d 1585, 1588, 272 Cal.
Rptr. 544, 545 (1990) .
198. Selger, quoting the ordinances, stated:
Los Angeles Municipal Code section 41.46 provides: "No per-
son shall fail, refuse or neglect to keep the sidewalk in front of his
house, place of business or premises in a clear and wholesome condi-
tion."
Los Angeles Municipal Code section 56.08, subdivision (c) pro-
vides: "No person having charge or control of any lot or premises
shall allow any soil, rubbish, trash, garden refuse, tree trimmings,
ashes, tin cans or other waste or refuse to remain upon any sidewalk,
parkway, or in or upon any street abutting on or adjacent to such lot
or premises, or which will interfere with or obstruct the free passage
of pedestrians or vehicles along any such street, sidewalk or parkway."
498 [Vol. 31
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gence per se. The jury found for the plaintiff and awarded him
damages. 1
99
The Court of Appeals for the Second District reversed.
Citing Schaefer, Williams, and Streets and Highways Code sec-
tion 5610, the court stated that statutes and ordinances requir-
ing abutters to maintain have "almost uniformly" been inter-
preted to create solely a duty owed to the city, and not a stan-
dard of care owed to the traveling public.200 Further, any
such duty owed to the public could be imposed "only if the
ordinance clearly and unambiguously so provided." 0 '
The court found that the Los Angeles ordinances at hand
"[did] not clearly so provide." It stated that since the duty to
clean was enforceable through criminal punishment or nui-
sance abatement under the Los Angeles Municipal Code, or
through the assessment procedures provided by sections 5600
through 5630 of the Streets and Highways Code, 20 2 these lo-
cal ordinances did not "expressly or unambiguously create a
standard of care for liability in civil damages to pedestrians
injured by a condition of the sidewalks not caused by defen-
dant."2
0 1
4. Summary of Local Legislation
In sum, while charter cities have the power to self-legislate
with respect to municipal affairs, they cannot enact legislation
that penetrates any area of exclusive statewide concern. Pre-
emption by state law occurs if a charter city enacts an ordi-
nance that expressly or impliedly duplicates, contradicts, or in
any way enters an area fully occupied by general state law.
Recent cases demonstrate the use (or the lack of use) of local
ordinances made by courts in determining municipal and abut-
ter liabilities.
Id. at 1589, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 546.
199. Id. By special verdict, "[t]he jury found total damages of $473,000, and
rendered verdict for plaintiff for $402,050 based on 15 percent comparative
negligence of plaintiff." Id.
200. Id. at 1589-90, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 546-47.
201. Id. at 1590, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 547.
202. "California Streets and Highways Code sections 5600 through 5630 pro-
vide a procedure for giving notice to [abutters] requiring [them] to repair the
sidewalk or be liable for the cost of repairs made by the city." Id. at 1591, 272
Cal. Rptr. at 547.
203. Id. at 1590-91, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 54748.
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III. PROBLEM
There are a number of obstacles facing sidewalk accident
victims and defendants, and their attorneys. As evidenced
above, California sidewalk accident law is scattered among
several state statutes, various city codes, and the many cases
interpreting them. California, therefore, lacks a single, compre-
hensive scheme with respect to analysis of liability for sidewalk
injuries.
Second, the existing law is deceptive and misleading. With
respect to abutters, the statutory exception, California Civil
Code section 1714(a),2" 4 swallows the general rule, Streets
and Highways Code section 5610.205 Furthermore, the rele-
vant case law, although most often finding for the defendant
abutter, incorrectly interprets 'statutes and other cases, thereby
creating conflicting theories of analysis within the same area of
liability. Jones uses a historical pattern of care approach for
imposing liability, while Williams mandates the existence of a
state statute or a city ordinance clearly giving notice that liabili-
ty may be imposed.0 6 While Jones incorrectly interpreted
Low, Williams intruded on statewide concerns by allowing city
ordinances to dictate local standards of liability.
Third, the California Government Code seems to absolve
public entities from liability where they own the fee underlying
the sidewalk as well as where their sole ownership is an ease-
ment over the land. Fourth, although government tort liability
is a statewide concern, the California Constitution provides a
means by which charter cities can increase abutters' duties or
impose liability upon them for failure to maintain.0 7 The
looming possibility of local alteration of statewide standards
creates constant uncertainty.
Finally, it is evident that the present statutes and their
recent judicial interpretations are insufficient. Since the state
of sidewalk law in California is so uncertain, complete revision
of the current statutes is necessary to ensure equal application
204. The exception is provided by CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714(a) (Deering 1978 &
Supp. 1991).
205. The general rule is provided by CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE § 5610 (1978).
206. See supra notes 131-49 and accompanying text.
207. See generally supra notes 153-203 and accompanying text.
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of standards governing this area of law.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Lack of a Comprehensive Scheme
The major defect in current sidewalk liability law in Cali-
fornia is its lack of cohesiveness. Any plaintiff's attorney who is
cautious enough to name the city, the abutter, and any third
parties as defendants must search diverse sources for the appli-
cable law. In making his legal arguments, a lawyer must consult
the Streets and Highways Code,208 the Civil Code2 0 9 and, as-
suming the city accepts the claim, the Government Code. 10
Additionally, the attorney must check the city code to deter-
mine the effect, if any, that it has on state statutes. Finally, he
must consult extensive and inconsistent case law to interpret
these state statutes and city ordinances. The result is a timely,
costly hunt for the law. The widespread existence of sidewalks
not only in California but also throughout the entire United
States, in addition. to the likely occurrence of sidewalk acci-
dents, mandates cohesive legislation devoted to the analysis of
liability for sidewalk accidents.
California needs a single article, located in the logical
place, the Streets and Highways Code,2 1' that addresses lia-
bility for sidewalk accidents. The article's provisions must re-
quire that in any sidewalk accident action, the city,212 the
abutter, and third parties be automatically named as de-
fendants, effectively eliminating the current prerequisite of
claim acceptance by the city in sidewalk accident cases. This
scheme fosters judicial economy.214
208. Specifically, he must consult Streets and Highways Code section 5610.
209. Specifically, he must consult Civil Code section 1714(a).
210. He must consult the California Tort Claims Act, specifically Government
Code sections 835, 835.2, and 835.4.
211. The Streets and Highways Code is the best location for the revised
chapter and its articles since sidewalks are a part of the street, and since substan-
tial legislation pertaining to the subject of sidewalks already exists within this
Code.
212. In addition, the plaintiff should name any public employees which may
be responsible.
213. In naming the abutter, the plaintiff should name the landowner as well as
any lessees.
214. This scheme prevents the multiplicity of suits that could arise if a plaintiff
mistakenly believes that sidewalks are solely the city's responsibility.
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B. Misleading, Ambiguous Laws
A second problem with the current California sidewalk
laws is their lack of clarity. In some instances, the laws simply
contradict each other.
1. Laws Regulating Liability of Abutters
a. Deficient State Statutes
The primary section employed in abutter liability cases is
Streets and Highways Code section 5610. Although the section
has been interpreted to provide a general rule of non-liability
of abutters for their failure to maintain, the section fails to
identify any possible exceptions. However, an exception entire-
ly outside the Streets and Highways Code does exist. The ex-
ception appears in Civil Code section 1714(a). The Streets and
Highways Code is silent on exceptions to the general rule of
non-liability because section 5610, and the entire Improvement
Act, was intended to provide for repair and maintenance, not
for liability for accidents.2 1 5 Thus, at first glance, the law
seems to indicate that an abutter cannot be held liable, but a
significant exception does exist.
To alleviate this uncertainty, the Legislature must add a
provision to the Streets and Highways Code addressing the
issue of liability, or it must add provisions to the existing stat-
utes, clearly stating the nature and purpose of the sections and
identifying the exception to the general rule.
b. Conflicting Case Approaches
Case law interpreting abutter liability is also problematic.
It is generally accepted that a property owner is liable for any
willful or negligent act or omission216 in the care of his prop-
erty which caused harm to another outside his land. However,
the cases conflict in their analysis for determining liability for
dangerous conditions originating in the parkway or parking
strip.
215. See supra notes 63, 64, 72 and accompanying text.
216. The abutter, for example, failed to notice his son's toys on the sidewalk
or, having noticed the toys, failed to remove the toys from the sidewalk.
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1) Jones: Historical Pattern of Care
The Jones case stands for the rule that section 5610 does
not impose abutter liability. If a local code on point does not
exist, the court, in determining whether the defect is somehow
attributable to the abutter, must look to the historical pattern
of care with respect to sidewalks within the city. If the city has
traditionally maintained the sidewalks, inaction or simple main-
tenance by an abutter will not result in the requisite amount of
control necessary to support a finding of liability. Conversely,
if abutters have traditionally maintained the area, a failure to
do so or a negligent undertaking on the part of a particular
abutter will result in liability for any accident created there-
from. Thus, the historical pattern of care approach employed
by Jones relies on the undertaking of a certain activity by others
around a particular abutter to determine whether he must
maintain, and thus control, the sidewalk." 7 This is an illogi-
cal, inefficient way to determine control. Courts cannot de-
pend on such arbitrary standards.
Although not specifically addressed by Jones, the court
seems to indicate218 that the undertaking of simple mainte-
nance in a city where abutters have historically performed
217. Not only does the case state that the city's conduct in undertaking (or
not undertaking) maintenance determines the abutter's duty, but the action of
other abutters, in undertaking maintenance, would also impose such a duty. The
court's decision implies that had the City of Long Beach not undertaken mainte-
nance, the abutter would be liable. This is not logical. With thousands of leaves
partially covering the fronting sidewalk, an abutter would be well-advised to sweep
only if the city in which his property is located habitually maintains because in
this instance, the City of Long Beach, having undertaken maintenance of the
parkway, bears the duty. In this example, however, there would actually be less of
a need for the abutter to maintain because the City has done so.
If an abutter sweeps the leaves when the city has not undertaken mainte-
nance and therefore sidewalk care is especially necessary, the abutter risks estab-
lishing an affirmative duty upon himself. Thus, the court's logic and reasoning are
faulty.
218. Under Jones, liability may be imposed only if the malignant parkway
defect is "somehow attributable to the abutter." Technically, straying tree roots
that press up beneath the sidewalk creating a dangerous change in the level of a
sidewalk slab are attributable to the abutter if he so much as waters the fronting
parkway. The abutter's simple maintenance contributes to the growth of the tree
roots, causing them to stray. According to the court's logic, this simple action by
the abutter contributes, at least in part, to the creation of a dangerous parkway
condition.
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maintenance could be enough to constitute control, and there-
fore, liability. The rule penalizes abutters for keeping the side-
walk clear, for keeping nature alive, for maintaining an aesthet-
ically pleasing neighborhood, and for assisting the city.2 19 It
is poor public policy to punish abutters for performing such
tasks. Thus, the Jones approach is ultimately a hindrance to
efficient sidewalk care. The lack of incentives created by the
Jones approach with respect to voluntary abutter assistance in
cleaning the sidewalks results in unkept, unsafe sidewalks, and
inefficient use of the city's time, money and labor.
The Jones court relied heavily on Low,220 stating that Low
provided the basis for premising liability on the historical pat-
tern of care. Jones completely misinterpreted the Low case,
which simply noted that the county hospital, like other Sacra-
mento property owners, maintained the sidewalk and parkways
and, in doing so, allowed water-filled depressions to form. Low
mentioned Sacramento abutters as a group in order to arrive
at the main issue in Low, control. The Low court never stated
that Sacramento abutters' traditional maintenance of the park-
ways was the reason for imposing liability.2 21 Further, the
Low court never stated that, had abutters not undertaken main-
tenance or had the city traditionally maintained city sidewalks,
the county hospital abutter would have been absolved of its
previously allotted thirty percent share of liability.
Jones, in addition to misinterpreting Low, failed to distin-
guish the facts of Low. First, the court did not consider the fact
that both of the Low defendants, the city easement owner and
219. The abutter not only helps save the city's money, but more importantly,
he also helps save the city's time, which can be better spent elsewhere.
220. See supr notes 96-108 and accompanying text for a discussion of Low.
Stating that Low found the abutter to be liable in tort for injuries -occurring in
the parkway, an area of forseeable misuse, the Jones court logically extended liabil-
ity to the case where a pedestrian is injured by a defect, originating in the
parkway but affecting the sidewalk, built primarily for accommodation of foot traf-
fic. Jones v. Deeter, 152 Cal. App. 3d 798, 804-05, 199 Cal. Rptr. 825, 828-29
(1984).
221. In Low, "undisputed evidence" showed that Sacramento property owners,
not the municipality, maintained parking strips. Low v. City of Sacramento, 7 Cal.
App. 3d 826, 830, 87 Cal. Rptr. 173, 175 (1970). Thus, neither Jones nor Low,
upon which the Jones "historical pattern of care" approach was based, discussed
how a court is to determine a city's "traditional" or "historical" pattern of care. A
truly accurate determination of this would call for a survey of the property own-
ers in all of Long Beach.
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the county abutter, were public entities with excellent
cost-spreading abilities. Thus, contrary to the typical abutter
case, both potentially liable parties in Low were public entities.
Second, the county hospital abutter was open to the pub-
lic, inviting injured people as well as family and friends to use
the facilities. As such, the hospital bore greater duties toward
the plaintiff due to the special invitor/invitee relationship.
Third, the dangerous condition in Low was unnatural in origin
and was a recurring, obvious problem of which the county had
knowledge."22 Given the large amount of foot traffic entering
and exiting the hospital, the fact that members of the public
were invitees and that the misuse of the parking strip was fore-
seeable, the County had a duty higher than a private abutter
would have had. The County's power to remedy the condition
and its ownership of the underlying fee were the bases for the
court's finding that the County controlled the parkway.
22 3
In addition, the case involved a dispute between two pub-
lic entities, one wanting the other to be completely liable.
Thus, in this case, the Government Code was applicable be-
cause a public entity would ultimately pay. The court decided
to divide responsibility evenly.
224
Finally, as later noted by Williams, Jones falsely stated that
a city could pass on the duty of care owed to pedestrians via
the procedure established in the Streets and Highways Code.
Not only have state statutes requiring maintenance been inter-
preted not to impose a duty of care, but a transfer of such
liability would also tread on an area preempted by the state,
that is, government tort liability.
225
2) Williams: State Statute or City Ordinance
as a Prerequisite to the Imposition of Liability
In contrast to the Jones case, Williams stands for the prop-
osition that where an abutter does not possess or own the
222. "The county asked the city to prohibit parking along the hospital front-
age, but the city declined. The county suggested the possibility of paving the
parking strip but without success." Id. at 830, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 174-75.
223. This logic is also faulty because in theory, all Sacramento abutters as well
as the City have the power to prevent or remedy a dangerous condition.
224. Had the abutter (the County) been a private residential landowner, it
would have probably been successful in its claim.
225. See infra notes 243-55 and accompanying text.
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street easement and where he does not undertake to maintain
it, there exists no legal basis for the imposition of liability for
failure to maintain absent a statute or ordinance. 26 Although
Williams is more logical than Jones, its reasoning is not entirely
satisfactory.
Williams criticized Jones, failing to see any legal foundation
for the application of a historical pattern of care theory where
an abutter had not undertaken maintenance and was not re-
quired to do so by statute. However, this point is irrelevant
because a statute requiring maintenance does exist. Streets and
Highways Code section 5610 places a duty of repair on "[t]he
owners of lots ... fronting on any ... public street ... "227
Thus, a maintenance requirement is applicable to all abutters,
not just to those who own the street fee or hold title to the
sidewalk.2 Similarly, the San Jose City Code mentions noth-
ing about technical ownership of the sidewalk in its imposition
of a duty to maintain.
Section 5610's disregard of technical ownership of the
sidewalk and the requirement of "clear and unambiguous legis-
lative language" as a prerequisite for the imposition of liabili-
ty229 are in accord with public policy. Section 5610 imposes a
duty to maintain on every abutter regardless of how far into
the street each actually owns. Thus, the duty is imposed on
every abutter, not just on those which own to the middle of
the street. Furthermore, the statute gives abutters notice of lia-
bility they might incur if they fail to maintain. Unfortunately,
Williams assumed for purposes of the case that any such munic-
ipal legislation would be valid, that is, that it would not conflict
with the California Tort Claims Act and that it would not be
considered legislation on a statewide concern.2 30 Thus, the Wil-
226. The court based its third statement on its upholding of Schaefer (section
5610 does not impose liability on abutters), Schwartz (absent a special relationship
or statute giving rise to a duty, a person has no duty to protect others from
perils he did not create), and Rowland (a possessor or owner is under duty to act
reasonably to keep him premises in a safe condition). Williams v. Foster, 216 Cal.
App. 3d 510, 265 Cal. Rptr. 15 (1989).
227. CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE § 5610 (Deering 1978).
228. Simply adding the words "[flailure to maintain may result in abutter's lia-
bility for injuries suffered thereby" would make all abutters, irrespective of techni-
cal ownership, liable for failure to maintain.
229. An example of clear and unambiguous language is in the Sacramento
ordinances cited in Gemsch. See supra note 188.
230. See infra notes 243-55 and accompanying text for al argument that such
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liams approach left unanswered the vital question of the validi-
ty of local legislation affecting the rules provided by the Gov-
ernment Tort Claims Act.
2. Laws Regarding Liability of Public Entities
a. Incomplete State Statute
With respect to public entities, state law involving liability
is ambiguous. Government Code section 830(c) states that pub-
lic property does not include easements over the public prop-
erty which are not owned or controlled by the public entity.
This section completely conflicts with the Low holding. In Low,
the public entity abutter, a county hospital, owned the fee and
the city owned an easement over it. Section 830(c) seems to
indicate that if the county had not exerted any control over
the sidewalk, it would have been absolved of liability, thereby
leaving the city to pay the entire seventy percent judgment.
Clearly, section 830, as written, fails to consider the special
circumstances that arise when the abutter happens to be a pub-
lic entity.
b. Conflicting State Statutes
Section 831.3 of the Government Code and section 5610
of the Streets and Highways Code are in conflict. Section 831.3
states that a public entity is not liable for any injury due to
"maintenance or repair on any road which has not officially
been accepted as a part of the road system under the jurisdic-
tion of the public entity."23 ' Thus, under section 831.3, a
public entity can only be held liable if it has accepted the
street easement.
232
In contrast to section 831.3, Streets and Highways Code
section 5610 states that all owners of property fronting public
streets must maintain the sidewalks and parkways. The section,
legislation is not valid.
231. Streets and Highways Code section 1806 effectively states the same:
[No city shall] be held liable for failure to maintain any road unless
any until it has been accepted into the city street system by resolu-
tion of the governing body.
CAL. STs. & HIGH. CODE § 1806 (Deering 1978).
232. This would indicate liability if the public entity owned the fee under the
street as well.
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making no reference to ownership of the underlying fee, holds
abutters responsible for maintenance. As Schaefer has interpret-
ed, this responsibility for maintenance does not create liability
for injuries.
Section 5610 implies that because the abutter cannot be
held liable, the sole recourse available is with the city. Section
831.3, however, absolves the city of liability when the sidewalk
has not formally been accepted as part of the city road system.
Thus, the city is not liable when an abutter owns the fee and
the city fails to formally accept the sidewalk. Section 831.3
effectively limits city liability to those instances where the city
owns the fee or where an abutter owns the fee and the city has
formally accepted it into the city street system. This resulting
limitation is inconsistent with section 5610.
C. Looming Possibility of Local Legislation
Another problem with government liability for sidewalk
defects is the possible effect of California Constitution article
XI, section 5. Under section 5, a charter city can enact laws
regarding sidewalk care within its city limits. A city code can
effectively impose liability upon an abutter for failure to main-
tain. 3 This situation creates great uncertainty. The possibili-
ty of change within certain cities, and along with these changes
the probability of unequal imposition of duties and liabilities
among California residents, poses a continuous threat. The
probability of unequal imposition of liability brings into ques-
tion the validity of local legislation altering sidewalk care and
liability for sidewalk accidents.
1. Sidewalk Maintenance and Repair
a. Nature and Application of Section 5610
Problems do not exist with respect to a charter city in-
creasing or decreasing the duties of an abutter for sidewalk
care. Section 5601 of the Streets and Highways Code indicates
that the chapter" 4 only applies to maintenance and repair pro-
ceedings, and section 5602 of the same code states that "[The]
chapter constitutes a separate and alternate procedure for per-
233. See, e.g., supra note 188.
234. CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE §§ 5600-5630 (Deering 1978).
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forming the work specified therein.""' The statute indicates
that the procedure therein provided is solely an alternative
method for getting the work completed and that other proce-
dures for street maintenance and repair may exist within a city.
These can include informal procedures23 6 or formally enact-
ed procedures.2 "' Formally adopted procedures are, of
course, preferred because they give clear notice to the resi-
dents as to their duties. Conceivably, the Streets and Highways
Code could require charter cities to formally adopt either sec-
tion 5610 or a procedure of their own.
Hence, a city could provide for street maintenance and
repair in its charter by increasing or decreasing the duties
placed upon abutters by section 5610. If the city is a general
law city with no charter, section 5610 would govern as the ap-
plicable law. Similarly, if the city is a charter city, but silent
with respect to the performance of street work, the charter
would imply adoption of general laws (i.e. the procedure pro-
vided by sections 5600 through 5630). Alternatively, a charter
city may state that the city is exclusively responsible for per-
forming repairs, but that abutters must bear the cost. This
would effectively reduce the abutters' duties to one of reim-
bursement.
Finally, a city charter could impose additional duties on
abutters. For example, a charter could require abutters to noti-
fy the city of sidewalk defects or any other problems.38 Such
a duty is logical where cities are large and it would be difficult
for the city to continuously inspect every inch of sidewalk.
Property owners are generally in the best position to become
aware of disrepair and to correct conditions.3 9 Moreover,
the property owner has a specific interest in keeping the side-
walk in good condition, and the additional duty of notification
235. CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE § 5602 (Deering 1978)(empliasis added).
236. Jones adopted an informal historical pattern of care approach.
237. The Sacramento ordinance cited in Gemsch is an example of formally
enacted procedures. See supra note 188.
238. The Sacramento City Code discussed in Gemsch placed upon abutters the
additional duty of notifying the city of problems. See supra note 188.
239. "[T]he city would have to have inspectors circulating throughout the area,
day and night . . . to discover and remove . . . material from the sidewalks."
Selger v. Steven Brothers, Inc., 222 Cal. App. 3d 1585, 1591, 272 Cal. Rptr. 544,
548 (1990) (citing Kotronakis v. City and County of San Francisco, 192 Cal. App.
2d 624, 629-30, 13 Cal. Rpir. 709, 712 (1961)).
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would, therefore, be only a minor inconvenience. It is in a
business owner's own interest to have a safe means of ingress
and egress for employees, customers and other invitees. A resi-
dential owner's concern focuses upon the safety of his family
and invitees such as friends.
The procedure provided by sections 5600 through 5630 is
available to all cities24 that have failed to adopt an alterna-
tive system for performance of and payment for street work.
Allowing for alternate procedures may be advantageous given
the different sizes and budgets of various cities. Procedures uti-
lized by one city may not be practical for another. This holds
especially true for a city where other, more pressing needs
exist.
b. Sidewalk Maintenance and Repair Is a Municipal
Affair
The fact that the general subject of sidewalks is a munici-
pal affair lends additional support to the validation of local
legislation addressing solely sidewalk maintenance and pay-
ment for sidewalk repairs. Regulation of streets in this manner
is directly related to the internal business affairs of a city. Per-
formance of and payment for work is directly related to the
economic affairs of a city as well as to public safety. The use of
land and the use of streets are historically subjects of munici-
pal regulation. Clearly, maintenance and repair of streets, side-
walks and parkways affect their use.
More specifically, local regulations regarding street open-
ing, maintenance and improvement have been held valid.
Maintenance and repair fall into this category of valid munici-
pal action. The fact that maintenance must be financed gives
the municipality further grounds for action with respect to
maintenance.241 In addition, local sidewalks are of a special
concern to city inhabitants who make the most use of them
and derive special benefits from them.242
240. The procedure is available to both general law cities and charter cities.
241. Obviously, improvements cannot be made unless funds exist to pay for
them.
242. See supra note 167.
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2. Abutter Liability for Sidewalk Injuries Due to Failure to
Maintain or Repair
Although local legislation affecting the duty to maintain is
valid, local legislation imposing liability upon the abutter for
failure to maintain is invalid. The Williams court noted this
possible invalidity,43 but failed to address the question.244
a. Government Tort Liability Is a Statewide Concern
The question of liability of a city to someone injured as a
result of a defective condition of property owned or controlled
by the city is a matter of general statewide concern not within
the sphere of municipal affairs.2 45 Thus, any time a city char-
ter provides a mechanism whereby it excludes itself from state-
proscribed liability, it is void.246
b. Examples of Municipal Code Provisions that Pass
Ultimate Liability to the Abutter
An example of a local provision that transfers liability can
be seen in the Sacramento City Code cited in Gemsch. One of
the Sacramento ordinances entitled "Liability for injuries
243. Jones had incorrectly suggested this could be clone through the Streets
and Highways Code sections.
244. The analysis assumed municipal ordinances imposing liability for failure to
maintain were valid.
245. When municipal codes or ordinances conflict with the general law, and if
the general law occupies the field with respect to the particular subject, the state
laws preempt the municipal rules. Of the three tests that can be used to deter-
mine whether a subject has been preempted, the first is easily satisfied. Preemp-
tion occurs when "the subject matter has been so fully and completely covered by
general law as to clearly indicate that it has become exclusively a matter of state
concern." Since the Government Code defines different government entities,
allocates powers and duties, governs liabilty of public entities and provides the
procedure for filing claims against them, and since there is a mass of case law
interpreting these code sections, charter cities cannot adopt themselves out of
liability. 45 CAL. JUR 3D, Municipalities § 112 (1978).
246. As the defendant in Williams, Foster clearly claimed in his defense:
[I]f the [local] ordinances do create . . . a duty to members of the publi4
they are invalid because they in effect "pass on" liability to the abutting
owners for unsafe sidewalk conditions and, therefore, conflict with the
Governmental Tort Claims Act, which concerns government liability,
an area of statewide concern upon which charter cities may not legis-
late.
Williams v. Foster, 216 Cal. App. 3d 510, 514, 265 Cal. Rptr. 15, 17 (1989).
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where repair or report not made" stated, "If, in consequence
of any sidewalk being defective.., any person... who...
suffers damage ... through any defect of a sidewalk may have
recourse for damages thus suffered against the person failing to
repair such defect .. ... 247 Thus, a city ordinance can specifi-
cally impose liability for failure to maintain.
Such a simple statement of liability, however, is not the
only way local legislatures can attempt to pass on their liability.
If a city code provides for indemnification by abutters, it has
effectively passed liability on to the abutter.
Finally, a city ordinance proscribing a period shorter or
longer than that proscribed by state statute, is void.24' By
changing the statute of limitations, a city can increase its
chance of being excluded from liability. A shortened time peri-
od may not be enough time for a plaintiff to find an attorney
and put a case together. Although a longer statute could also
work to the detriment of a plaintiff (it may cause him to put
off the suit, for example), a shorter statute is, obviously, more
dangerous for the abutter. Either change, however, would
bring the city ordinance within the scope of the general law on
the subject of government liability, an area of statewide con-
cern.
c. Abutter Liability Is a Statewide Concern
Any method described above would make an abutter lia-
ble for failure to maintain. This type of local legislation clearly
impacts upon the issue of government tort liability. Abutter
liability for sidewalk accidents is also however, a statewide con-
cern.
1) Occupation of the Field
State legislative intent to occupy a field to the exclusion of
all local legislation can be determined by examining the pur-
pose, scope and language of the "legislative scheme." With
247. City of Sacramento v. Gemsch Investment Co., 115 Cal. App. 3d 869, 171
Cal. Rptr. 764 (1981) (emphasis added) (quoting Sacramento ordinances in effect
at the time of the accident).
248. See, e.g., Eastlick v. City of Los Angeles, 29 Cal. 2d 661, 177 P.2d 558
(1947) (charter period was shorter); 1lelback v. City of Long Beach, 50 Cal. App.
2d 242, 123 P.2d 62 (1942) (charter period was longer).
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respect to Streets and Highways Code section 5610, the pur-
pose and intent of the legislature is clear. The Improvement
Act has been interpreted by Schaefer not to impose a duty for
failure to maintain. Further, in later amendments, the Legisla-
ture clearly states that the chapter is only applicable to mainte-
nance and repair proceedings of sidewalks and is only an alter-
native procedure for this maintenance. Thus, the sections do
not impose any sort of liability.
Many cases after Schaefer (interpreting the 1935 version of
the Improvement Act), and the passage of Streets and High-
ways Code section 5610 (the 1941 virtually exact version of the
Improvement Act as amended in 1935), have upheld the prin-
ciple of non-liability. 49 As stated in Williams:
This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that...
Schaefer... has been in existence since 1944 and the Leg-
islature ha[s] never counteracted its holding .... [Tihe
Legislature is presumed to have been aware of
long-standing judicial construction of a statute and ap-
prove it where that construction is not altered by subse-
quent legislation.2
50
Thus, the Legislature could have enacted a statute that
provides for abutter liability. Alternatively, it could have pro-
vided that public entities may enact ordinances (1) making
abutters expressly liable for failure to maintain or (2) providing
for indemnification of the city by abutters. The Legislature has
failed, however, to do either.
2) Preemption by the State
Preemption by the state with respect to abutter liability is
required under each of the three alternative tests. 251 Under
the first test, it is fair to say that liability of abutters has been
so fully and completely covered by general law as to clearly
indicate that it has become exclusively a matter of state con-
cern. Not only is passing liability from the city to the abutter a
249. These cases include Moeller v. Fleming, 136 Cal. App. 3d 241, 186 Cal.
Rptr. 24 (1982); Jones v. Deeter, 152 Cal. App. 3d 798, 199 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1984);
Williams v. Foster, 216 Cal. App. 3d 510, 265 Cal. Rptr. 15 (1989); and Selger v.
Steven Brothers, Inc., 222 Cal. App. 3d 1585, 272 Cal. Rptr. 544 (1990).
250. Williams v. Foster, 216 Cal. App. 3d 510, 265 Cal. Rptr. 15 (1989).
251. See supra notes 173-77 and accompanying text.
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clear violation of the California Tort Claims Act,252 but impo-
sition of liability on the abutter may also violate section 5610,
which. has been held to impose solely a duty to maintain, not
liability for defective maintenance.
Under the second test, an assumption can be made that
abutter liability has been partially covered by the general law.
Not only do the codes exist, but the case law interpreting them
at least partially covers abutter liability. Furthermore, although
the Legislature has not necessarily couched abutter liability "in
such terms so as to indicate clearly that a paramount state
concern will not tolerate ... additional local action,
" 25s state-
wide application of tort laws to ensure uniform treatment of
everyone is a paramount state concern.
The strongest argument can be made under the third test.
If "[a] subject ... has been partially covered by general law,
and.., is of such a nature that the adverse effect of a local
ordinance on the transient citizens of the state [would] out-
weigh the possible benefit to the city," then the subject is pre-
empted by state laws. Again, abutter liability has been partially
covered by the general law, in statutes and in the case law
interpreting them. The second portion of the third alternative
test is also satisfied. Allowing cities to determine standards for
holding parties liable for sidewalk accidents is fundamentally
unfair to all transient citizens in the state of California. A
plaintiff's right to indemnification by the city for an injury due
to an unreasonably dangerous condition would be contingent
upon the city in which he was "lucky" enough to fall. Further-
more, city alteration of standards for liability would create
unequal application of general California tort principles within
the state.
3) Comparison of Abutter Liability to Typical
Municipal Affairs
Finally, whereas local legislation deals with practical as-
pects of running a city,2 54 statewide legislation deals with per-
vasive practical and theoretical concerns throughout the state.
Practical statewide concerns include the licensing of profes-
252. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
253. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 167-69, 174 and accompanying text.
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sionals; the compensation of state employees; standards for
phone communication; the licensing of building contractors;
and other areas demanding statewide consensus.255 In these
areas, it would be bad policy to allow the application of differ-
ent standards within different cities. It would also be bad pub-
lic policy to allow charter cities to dictate the standards for tort
liability (of abutters and themselves) to be applied within their
boundaries. Tort liability has nothing to do with the practical
aspects of running a city. It is not, therefore, a municipal af-
fair. The public nature of sidewalks and their accessibility to all
California residents demands a statewide consensus, that is,
uniform standards for imposing liability throughout the several
California cities. Prohibition of local legislation on the subject
would ensure consistent application of statutes and case law
throughout the state of California.
D. Judicial Interpretation Is Not Enough
Although statutes do exist, a bulk of the interpretation has
been left to the courts. The Legislature has not done an effi-
cient job in explaining the laws in the area of California side-
walk accident liability nor in enumerating the goals of these
laws. The Legislature has also failed to state in a statute that
city charters are not to alter state rules with regard to liability.
Improvement by way of a complete revision of the current
statutes is necessary to ensure equal application of these laws.
V. PROPOSAL
In order to ensure this equal application throughout the
state, California must enact legislation that specifically ad-
dresses liability of cities and abutters for sidewalk accidents.
California Streets and Highways Code sections 5600 through
563056 should be reorganized and amended to read as fol-
lows:
255. See supra notes 170-77 and accompanying text.
256. Currently, the Improvement Act of 1911 constitutes Division 7 of the
California Streets and Highways Code. Sections 5600-5630 constitute Article 1,
General Provisions; Article 2, Repairs; and Article 3, Collection of Cost of Repair.
These articles, in turn, constitute Chapter 22 which is entitled "Maintenance of
Sidewalks." Chapter 22 is located in Division 7, Part 3 entitled "Performing the
Work."
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CHAPTER 22: SIDEWALKS
ARTICLE 1:
GENERAL PROVISIONS
SECTION 5600: "SIDEWALK"; "PARKWAY" OR "PARKING
STRIP"; "ABUTTER," "ABLTIMNG LANDOWNER" OR "ADJOIN-
ING LANDOWNER"; "OWNERSHIP"; "POSSESSION"; "PUBLIC
ENTrrY"
As used in this chapter:
(a) A "sidewalk" is the part of a public street designed
for use by pedestrians. Sidewalks are usually constructed
differently than the rest of the street, and may include
parkways or parking strips. Although open for public use,
sidewalks are neither public nor private property. They
constitute, rather, a unique type of property with unique
standards for care and determination of liability for acci-
dents thereon.
(b) A "parkway" or "parking strip" is the usually land-
scaped strip located on that part of the sidewalk most
adjacent to the street.
(c) An "abutter" or "abutting landowner" or "adjoin-
ing landowner" refers to an owner or possessor of land
immediately abutting or adjoining the fronting sidewalk
and parkway. Abutters can be private parties, commercial
enterprises, public entities or municipalities such as the
city, or any other party owning or possessing property
abutting a sidewalk.
(d) "Ownership" refers to a fee title in property, or
title to an easement over the property.
(e) "Possession" is equated with occupancy and con-
trol (as determined by section 5611).
(f) "Public Entity" includes cities, towns, counties,
districts, the state, the Regents of the University of Califor-
nia, the public authorities, and other political subdivisions,
including municipalities.
SECTION 5601: APPLICATION OF CHAPTER
This chapter shall only apply to:
(a) maintenance and repair proceedings, whether
upon work originally done under this division or other-
wise; and to
(b) the determination of abutter and municipal liabili-
ty for sidewalk accidents.
This chapter shall not be used for the construction of
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new improvements. The "Special Assessment Investigation,
limitation and Majority Protest Act of 1931" shall not
apply to proceedings taken under this chapter.
SECTION 5602: NATURE AND PURPOSE OF CHAPTER
(a) This chapter constitutes a separate and alternate
procedure for performing the work specified herein and,
except for the provisions of Part 5 of this division, no
other provisions of this division shall apply to proceedings
instituted hereunder.
(b) This chapter constitutes the sole method of deter-
mining abutter and city liability for sidewalk accidents.
ARTICLE 2:
DUTY TO MAINTAIN AND REPAIR
SECTION 5610: DUTY TO MAINTAIN SIDEWALKS; LIABILITY
FOR CONDITIONS CREATED BY GRANTEES OF CITY PERMITS;
DUTY TO REPAIR SIDEWALKS
(a) All abutters shall maintain the sidewalks and park-
ways fronting their property in such condition so that the
sidewalks and parkways will not endanger persons or prop-
erty or interfere with the public convenience in the use of
those areas.
Abutters are excepted from this duty when those
conditions have been created or maintained in, upon,
along, or in connection with such sidewalk by any person
other than the abutter, under and by virtue of any permit
or right granted to him by law or by the city authorities,
and such persons shall be under a like duty in relation
thereto.
(b) When any portion of the sidewalk is out of repair
and in condition to endanger persons or property or to
interfere with the public convenience in the use of such
sidewalk, the superintendent of streets shall notify the
abutter to repair the sidewalk by the proccdure provided
in Article 4 of this chapter. Payment for such repairs shall
be in accordance with Article 5.
SECTION 5610.2: MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR ARE MUNICI-
PAL AFFAIRS
Performance of and payment for sidewalk mainte-
nance and repair are municipal affairs upon which charter
cities can legislate. As stated in Section 5602(a), the pur-
pose of this chapter is to provide a separate and alternate
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procedure for sidewalk work. Charter cities can, therefore,
alter these duties of maintenance and repair by increasing
or decreasing abutter responsibilities. For example, a char-
ter city can additionally require abutters to report any
defects.
All charter cities are required to formally state in
their charters the duties the cities impose on their inhabit-
ants. They can either adopt the duties proscribed by this
chapter or they can create their own. They cannot, howev-
er, rely on patterns of care informally adopted by the city
and its inhabitants.
General law cities must follow the procedure for
maintenance and repair provided by this chapter and can-
not rely on any historical or traditional patterns of care
within the city.
ARTICLE 3:
LIABILITY FOR SIDEWALK ACCIDENTS
SECTION 5611: LIABILITY FOR SIDEWALK ACCIDENTS
(a) Abutters cannot be held liable for their failure to
maintain or repair sidewalks or parkways. Where an abut-
ter has failed to maintain or repair, a plaintiff's sole re-
course is with the city and any third parties (other than the
abutter) that may be involved.
Abutters can, however, be held liable if they acted
willfully or negligently with respect to their property and
these acts or omissions created a dangerous sidewalk or
parkway condition which caused injury to another. The
test to be used in determination of liability is provided by
California Civil Code section 1711(a). In general, simple
acts of maintenance are not enough to impose liability.
(b) A public entity, specifically the city, can be held
liable for an abutter's failure to maintain or repair. Liabili-
ty of a public entity is to be determined by the California
Tort Claims Act (California Government Code sections
810 through 996.6) and specifically by California Govern-
ment Code section 835.
SECTION 5611.2: LIABILITY FOR SIDEWALK ACCIDENTS IS A
STATEWIDE CONCERN
Liability for sidewalk injuries is a matter of exclusive
statewide concern upon which charter cities cannot legis-
late. As stated in Section 5602(b), this chapter constitutes
the sole method of determining abutter and municipal
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liability for sidewalk accidents. It is the intent of the Legis-
lature to fully occupy the field of liability for sidewalk inju-
ries and to preempt all local municipal legislation on the
subject. Charter cities cannot, therefore, adopt any charter
provisions which effectively transfer the city's liability. For
example, a charter city cannot state that abutters will be
held liable for injuries due to their failure to maintain the
sidewalks.
General law cities must also adhere to the method
provided in this chapter for determining abutter and mu-
nicipal liability.
SECTION 5611.4: AUTOMATIC NAMING OF DEFENDANTS;
ALLOCATION OF FAULT
In any sidewalk accident case, the abutter, the city
and any relevant third parties shall automatically be named
as defendants. There is no preliminary requirement that
the city first accept the claim. The court shall, under Sec-
tion 5611, determine whether the abutter and city are in
any way liable for the sidewalk defect. It will also deter-
mine, under ordinary principles of negligence (which, like
abutter liability, is covered by California Civil Code Section
1714(a)), whether any third parties are responsible.
The court shall then allot fault among the plaintiff,
the abutter, the city, and any third parties, and shall ren-
der a special verdict, ordering payment by each in propor-
tion to such fault.
The current sections 5612 through 5630 should remain
intact, but sections 5612 through 5618 should be placed in
Article 4, entitled "Method of Giving Notice to Repair," and
sections 5625 through 5630, the former Article 3, should be
placed in Article 5, entitled "Collection of Cost of Repair." 57
This legislation, a combination of brand new provisions
and revised former provisions, solves the problems previously
discussed in this comment. First, the proposed chapter pro-
vides one legislative scheme that deals specifically with Cali-
257. Compare CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE §§ 5600-5630 (Deering 1978) with the
Chapter 22 sections proposed in this comment. The proposed version of Chapter
22 contains five rather than three articles. They include: Article 1, General Provi-
sions; Article 2, Duty to Maintain and Repair; Article 3, Liability for Sidewalk
Accidents; Article 4, Method of Giving Notice to Repair; and Article 5, Collection
of Cost of Repair.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
fornia sidewalks. It provides a structured framework for analy-
sis. The beginning of the chapter clearly states its purpose and
defines all applicable language.
Second, the statute clarifies all misleading and ambiguous
laws. With respect to abutters, the provisions clearly state that
abutters have a duty to maintain and repair. In accordance
with Williams, the statute states that there is no liability for any
failure to perform these duties absent a statute clearly stating
such an imposition. This statute specifically states that there is
a lack of liability.
However, these statutes also clearly indicate that abutters
can be held liable in certain circumstances. The Jones holding
indicates that in those instances where liability can be found
under Civil Code section 1714(a), something more than simple
maintenance is necessary for a finding of liability.
2 58
With respect to governmental entities, the statute clearly
states that technical ownership of the fee or easement is irrel-
evant. The statute holds open the possibility of public entity
liability where an abutter owns the fee, where the city owns an
easement or where the city owns the fee.
Third, the statute addresses the problem created by char-
ter city legislation. With respect to sidewalk maintenance and
repair, charter cities can adopt the procedure provided in the
codes above or they can legislate for themselves, tailoring this
procedure for sidewalk work within their own city limits.
Whichever they chose, charter cities are required to formally
recite in their respective charters, exactly what is expected of
abutters. These declarations act as notice to the abutters.
With respect to liability for sidewalk accidents, the pro-
posed code declares that liability for these accidents is a state-
wide concern over which the Legislature expressly intends to
occupy the field. As such, the state regulations totally preempt
any and all local legislation on the subject of liability, render-
ing any further legislation void.
Fourth, the sections requiring automatic naming of certain
enumerated defendants promotes a fair allocation of fault as
well as judicial efficiency. Finally, this singular legislative
scheme, as opposed to ad hoc judicial interpretations, allows
for uniform application of sidewalk abutter and municipal laws
258. Jones, 152 Cal. App. 3d 798, 199 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1984).
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throughout the state of California.
Applying this proposed legislation to the hypothetical case
stated in the Introduction, Plaintiff Ann Pedestrian would
name Piano Teacher and the city as defendants.'" In allot-
ting fault between Ann, Piano, and the city, the court would
look to each party's liability under section 5611. With respect
to Plaintiff Ann, the court would look at the reasonableness of
her actions.2 60 The court would consider the fact that a
ten-inch difference in height between two sidewalk slabs is like-
ly to cause harm to a pedestrian. It may also, however, consid-
er Plaintiff Ann's familiarity with the sidewalk, having traveled
down it every week for a year on the way to her lesson. At the
very least, the court might state that a ten-inch difference in
height between slabs is such a visible defect that Ann would
have seen it had she been exercising due care. Finally, the
court would consider Plaintiff Ann's youth and the fact that
she is an invitee of the teacher, that is, a business customer.
Thus, they would allot Ann approximately ten percent fault.
The court would then examine the reasonableness of Pi-
ano Teacher's actions. The court would consider the fact that
she ran a business out of her home. In giving lessons there,
Piano holds her home open to her customers, thereby impos-
ing upon herself a higher duty to those customers to see that
the means of ingress and egress are safe. If the court found
that the piano teacher performed simple maintenance on the
parkway, it would state that this did not cause or aggravate the
dangerous condition. The court would find Piano Teacher
approximately thirty percent liable because, in running a busi-
ness from her home, she owed a higher duty to her custom-
ers.
26 1
Finally, the court would examine the city's liability. If the
city in which Ann fell is a charter city, the court would study
its charter. 2  The court would then determine whether the
259. There is no indication any third parties are at fault.
260. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of public
policy considerations and other factors courts examine in determining reasonable-
ness.
261. The court could just as easily allot Piano Teacher fifteen, twenty, forty or
even fifty percent fault. The main point is that the court would allot more fault
to Piano, an adult invitor, than it would to Plaintiff Ann, a child invitee.
262. The reason for examination of the charter is not to locate laws imposing
liability or passing liability on to abutters, but rather to see if the city has in-
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requisite elements necessary for a finding of city liability have
been met.263 Establishing that the city either owned the side-
walk easement or the fee underneath it, and noting that the
city performed maintenance on the parkway, the court would
find that the city both owned and exerted control over the
sidewalk. The sidewalk and parkway would, therefore, be pub-
lic property. The court would obviously find the ten-inch dif-
ference to be a dangerous condition.
Assuming the court finds that the injury was proximately
caused by the dangerous condition and that the risk of injury
was reasonably foreseeable, the court would next look to see if
the dangerous condition was created by a public employee's
negligent act or omission, or if the city had actual or construc-
tive knowledge of the dangerous condition. In this case, con-
structive knowledge would be easy to show since the condition
has been in existence for two years. If the abutter reported the
condition to the city, actual knowledge would be found. Either
way, the court would probably find that the city has been neg-
ligent in failing to discover and repair the dangerous condition
during the entire two years of its existence. If the city's acts or
omissions are found to be unreasonable, it would be liable for
Ann's injury. A majority of the liability, for example sixty per-
cent, would be allotted to the city.
Costs would be tallied and each party would pay in pro-
portion to the degree of fault allocated by the court.
VI. CONCLUSION
Duties and liabilities regarding sidewalks are unclear, dis-
organized and misleading at best. Consequently, a plethora of
case law has developed attempting to interpret these disjointed
statutes. In addition to this problem, California Constitution
article XI, section 5 allows for possible alteration of abutter
liability standards, thereby creating great uncertainty. Thus,
uniform application in this area of law is severely compro-
mised. While much sidewalk law does exist, the decisions are
not guided by specific legislation precisely describing abutter
and municipal duties and liabilities. Further, the laws do not
creased the duty placed -upon itself.
263. See supra notes 33-57 and accompanying text for a description of the
requisite elements.
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describe whether or not local legislation on the subject is per-
mitted.
To ensure uniform application of sidewalk laws within the
state of California, a simple, comprehensive scheme of legisla-
tion is needed to define terms, clarify previous vague laws and
state the duties and possible liabilities of abutters and munici-
palities alike. By indicating that duties are municipal affairs
and liabilities are statewide concerns, the Legislature would
allow for local tailoring of practical aspects of running a city
such as the cleaning of sidewalks. At the same time, it would
protect against the looming possibility of cities altering state-
wide standards. The continuous threat of inconsistency in the
application of sidewalk liability laws would effectively be elimi-
nated. These laws based on negligence principles must protect
all California citizens regardless of the city in which they live.
For these reasons, the California Legislature must adopt the
proposed legislation.
Leonora M. Bova
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